István Tisza's liberalism was greatly interrelated with his political ideas and among the not too great number of his theoretical manifestations the ones dealing with the problems of liberalism are much more elaborated. Undoubtedly, however, his concept of the liberalism, at the same time, is also a national political doctrine to be
reconstructed jn this sense. Here it must be also stressed that we are sticking to our considerations that the dualistic interpretations of liberalism and the "classic" idealtypical ones are to be compared, that is, the term is used in this relation not stressing that the usage of the term is "ideo-typical" (idealtypisch in the sense of Max Weber). This relation is of direct importance. At the same time, when we must emphasize the "non-classic" type of the concept of liberalism, we do not wish to discuss the liberal elements of the liberalism of the dualistic period, and thus showing a extremistic attitude.
Liberalism an nation may be joined in István Tisza's way of thinking, first of all through the sphere of the "state". The purpose of the Hungarian state is the promotion of the national interests by applying the proper doctrines. Interrelatedness by the liberalism and the state may exist in several concrete form the turn of 1848 towards the state up the almost classically manifested "state" or "etatist" liberalism that characterized certain periods of the Austrian Empire after 1848.
Tisza's forging the concepts of nation, liberalism and state together is a theoretically also relevant version of the etatist liberalism. The main trend of the development was the following: the fundamental and definitive ideas after 1848 (best described by József Eötvös) follows the pragmatic and etatist liberalism that resulted in the Compromise of 1867 (Ausgleich). This liberalism, at the period, is sensitive to its relations with its own doctrines, and historical continuity. Till the 1880-1890s an even more pragmatic liberalism becomes prevailing that already tends to find harmonic and universalist solutions though in some features it preserves the traditional liberal motivation. It is followed by the break-through of the shocked by the modernistic trends of the turn of the century. István Tisza's political and ideology-historical activity fell first of all to the lastly mentioned two periods. In the first period this liberalism is still more or less progressive while in the second phase this feature disapperars. The young politician, for the rights of the reduced and pragmatic liberalism figths within the sphere of the aims of national harmony. It did not take but a few years that, in the next period the politician's attitude changed and starting from the pragmatic and moderate standpoint he, quite for obsolete reasons, was not able to "understand" the radical, i.e. the more radically liberal movements of the turn-of-the-century period.
Concept of reduced liberalism was outlined by István Tisza entitled as MAGYAR AGRÁR-POLITIKA (Hungarian Agrarian Policy). The included liberalism and nation concept can be, of course, interpreted only to the extent mentioned above, in the context of the harmonism and its political consequences that basically and gradually shocked the social sense of reality. This is also the motivating force that resulted Tisza's political and ideological realism with respect to reality. (Although ideological traditions acknowldge only the anti-progressive part of this issue for the turn of the century, it neglected the two-faced nature of this argument.) Historically, however, there are other ambigious Tisza-interpretations. Here it can be only briefly mentioned that e.g. Franz Ferdinand Crown Prince was not wiling to receive István Tisza (who by the way stuck strictly to the decisions of the Compromise (Ausgleich) of 1867 in spite the requests the Emperor Franz Joseph or of Czernin (3).
Tisza's "Hungarian Agrarian Policy" discusses the theoretical possibilities of the pragmatic liberalism and his relation to the nationalism among the conditions of the accelerating modernizations of the 1890s.
In the "Introduction" Tisza refers also to the crisis situation of the 1870s that could be helped also by the application of liberal strategies: "By introducing new production branches new income sources are opened: by more professional breeding and by more rational animal husbandry and farming the product yields can be
increased and may be made cheaper, it decreases the production costs / 1 metric centner, and as a result it does not only not collapses due the price depression but it becomes economic in the first period of consolidation" (4).
The liberal solution in this period (in the 1890s) was of national political importance. There were two equally considerable alternatives: a) the agrarian solution operated first of all by the introduction of state introduced protective duties, or b) some other type of new land distribution, at least through eliminating the entailed properties. These two methods had to be briefly described so that we could understand the national-political concept in Tisza's primary attitude: there is a liberal escape from the agricultural crisis of the 1890s without using the politically critical agrarian version. Tisza, however, was also against of the strengthening standpoint social scientifically and ideologically founded by "Twentieth Century Circle", appearing also in Endre Ady's poetry but which was also previously stated by authors much more loyal to the dualistic-hungarian establishment that the large farming estates mean both directly and indirectly an obstacle to achieving the joint national interests (5). Political contents of this liberalism becomes immediately clearer when István Tisza declares: "We may proudly look back on our fight: it is a bright and promising sign of the strengthand will-power of our nation (referring to the escape from the crisis of the 1870s - E.K.). It, in itself would not have been a success if our intentions had not been mat with favourable conditions. Improvement of the financial and credit conditions decreased our debts, and facilitated, although still among relatively great conditions, the meeting of the needs of working capital of our more intensiv economic activity. The increase of the town polulation, the industrial development and the non-agriculturally employed social groups increasing welfare increased the home consumption and produced new income sources for the farmers of large regions. The revolutionary development of our capitalism itself serves as basis of a continuosly increasing flourishing. The construction of the railway networks, its nationalization and the radical change of tarifs serve mainly the economic development of the farmer regions of the country" (6).
Within this statement Tisza's liberalistic attitude is proved not only by the fact that the close relation is declared by the farms and the working capital but also this statement had the stamps of a more advanced pragmatic liberalism appointing new aims to be achieved. The political agrarianism of the 1890s in Hungary has got its analogies allover in Europa is already a political phenomenon within which antipathy against industry and enterprises, clericalism and antisemitism are mixed and Tisza's previous statement is appearing as an open liberal disapproval of these phenomena. By this already both sides of the coin can be seen. Besides, it can be also indicated that the main trends of the Hungarian liberalism of the dualistic period, by the 1890s, reaches a reduced-pragmatic phase that, in itself, is increasingly saturated with harmonistic elements (7) but, at the same time, there are always new political challenges present that offer to the reduced elements of the liberalism new contents.
This duality increases the significance of Tisza's political position within the intellectual history of this period of the dualist system. He is the very person who proves that the "farmer" ("a gazda" - an expression in this case extended to everyone working in agruculture) is forced to accept the needs of the industrialization of the country, i.e. it is a mutual interest (8). The main aspects are summarized as follow: "As well as the boom of the industry and commerce, the capital accumulation is of primary interest of the farmers, our welfare is as well a vital condition for the industry and commerce. Especially, beside the predominantly ruling protective duty system, different social classes of all the nations depend on each other's consumption. An agriculture crisis that seriously undermine the farmer's economic position would gravely endanger the whole economic complex" (9).
Among the Hungarian conditions Tisza's polemy was against the fight for the rights in the public law, in international relation against the fight for the rights in the public law, in international relation against the German agrarianism, and even stronger against the spreading of the political strategy of the German agrarianism in Hungary.
The fight in public law, the public law based opposition fits into the context directly by the demanding of independent customs area, though it will turn out that this fitting is not an exlusive one. Tisza's opinion about solving the agricultural crisis by this method is the following: "Even the most orthodox friend of independence (...) may quietly accept the principle of the common customs area. It is not against the most rigidly realized personal union and it does not contradict the total separation of the military and foreign affairs. Legally it lives intact all the attributes of national independence. Establishment of the in dependent customs area would not bring along any public legal achievement. It would cause damages to Austria, but also for us, it would weaken both of us and it would decrease the power that is now available against external enemies..." (10).
Comparison of the political and economic features of the demanded independent customs area was an efficient weapon in Tisza's hand. We have already referred to the fact that the mentioned economic connection between the demand for the independent customs area and the agrarism is not all the only link. We wish to mention that in three seemingly remote sectors of the political sphere (independent customs area, agrarianism, aristocratic political articulations) frequently cover the intentions of the formerly conservative group of landed aristocracy. At the same time it is the public law slogan of politicians like Albert Apponyi for whom the demanding of independent customs area is part of his criticism of public law. Such particular combition of the elements is only one of the deeper connections of the dualistic policy and the political history of ideas. The demand for the independent customs area suggesting a radical desire for independence, the "modern" rightwing political concept of agrarianism and its aristocratic class basis, its decided, deep though hidden antiliberalism and antimodernism one of the complexes that offer us a view in to the complexity of this age and sphere.
In István Tisza's opinion spreading of the argumentation and, accordingly the practice of the German agrarian practice is a much more important challenge that the demand for independent customs area. By this, perhaps unwillingly, he also touches one of the structural question of theoretical importance of the German history, and what is more, this opinion has some significance even at the typological interpretation of the German history. The most frightening aspects to be taken over from the German agrarism is the following: "...under the slogen of the protection of the interest they want to turn the farmer society against the liberal development" (11). As in case of the independent customs area he made an attempt to distinguish the demand's political contents from the economic one, he does them same in this context as well: "...the representatives of the (German) agriculture are full social and political antipathy against the capital and not the objective economic conviction makes them against the capital, the stock exchanges and their business but the party emotions and party tactics. These tentious economic theories that are quite strange to the intellectual world of the Hungarian farmers (gazda) may have however find its way to the bitter soul of our farming society after the several disasters" (12). Not to discuss the agrarian's "clean", economically motivated contradictions of interests with the capital, still Tisza's ideas are worth consideration. In case of the German situation there is a pre-prepared feature of "antipathy", a social psychological initiation and hits in the centre of the German problem. Then it is not surprising that Tisza attempts to find arguments against the "social and political antipathy". He does not declare a "badly selective agitative slogan of the enemy image of the international capital" (13) his source about "the frequently dubious business" would not give him the sufficient support for this judgment.
If its not merely a tactical attitude, though it is good for that as well, Tisza's attempt is succesful to remind the agrarian ambitions of the social democracy as joint enemy: "For one trend I am aware of the solidarity of the capital, and this is the solidarity against the social democratic ambitions to attack the private property. Fighting against these ambitions is the interest of any types of properties or capitals, but first of that of the capital invested in real estate. For us, Hungarians, an especially grave mistake would be forget about this fact. With us socialism has been manifested in land distribution, for the Hungarian people the domains are much more vivid representatives of the capital than the movable properties, and if it can be made fight against the capital, it will attack at the possible beares place, and through the Zichys it will arrive to the Rotschilds" (14). It does not coincide with our actual argumentation (see mainly our Apponyi study) that the agrarian and the related, sometimes analogous trends contrary to the commonplace ideological opinions did look for relations with the socialism even if these attempts were hindered by the political realities of the period (15). The political sphere just created the compromise between the capital and the domains proposed by Tisza although this neither in the German, nor in the Hungarian development could eliminate the fundamental fights between these two groups in other spheres.
In the course of the interpretation and ciriticism of the German agrarianism made an ambitious historical theoretical approach: on the one hand he tries interpret the German development, and on the other he compars it with the Hungarian. It is not only noteworthy because by this Tisza refuses the historical motives feeding the relevance of agrarianism in the Hungarian development but also because suring this process he recomposes the similarities of the Hungarian and English versions of development.
The continental development is summarized by Tisza as follows: "For centuries the foreign political movement were closely related with the fight of the groups of the society of different interest. The rulers backed up by the urban bourgeoisie dealing with industry and commerce broke the feudal power and rights of the nobility, and the very same bourgeoisie achieved the institutions of individual and social freedom serving as the basis of modern social order either under the guidance of some extraordinary rulers, or against the rulers reconciled with the nobility. The political freedom and the idea of modern constitution was formulated by the bourgeoisie and became mature among the economic and political fights against feudal class. Merchants, craftsmen and urban population in general give the majority of the liberal party even today while a large part of the population enganged in agricultural activity, due to their traditions, got to the opposite political party. An obvious consequence is that the continental, and especially German liberalism is forged together with the social and economic interests, sympathy or antipathy against the modern society, political and economic conservativism. Liberalism and agriculture are against each others as enemies: the former one is prejudiced, one-sided, or at least indifferent concerning the justified interests of agriculture, while the latter is a real tool of the political and economic reaction" (16). The main thesis of the idea: basic tendency of the continental that the liberalism gets opposed to the agriculture, while England and Hungary were the exceptions. An ironical motive of this evolutionary outline that the French version of the classic continental development is in the same group with the German development. Tisza's explanation may be deduced to the fact that, in the past two decades, the large typological contradiction between the German and French development seemed to be fading. The English-Hungarian comparison, favoured that much in the dualist political thinking, is perhaps even more problematic. While within the continental development Tisza found practically the right trends. the English-Hungarian comparison, even is spite of his sober, realistic nature carried Tisza to the world of dreams: "There are only two countries in Europe the whole past of which is opposed to the historical development: England and our country" (17). Tisza's next argument, though basically mistaken, is rather characteristic: "Both (the English and the Hungarian - E.K.) nations had realized the national political unity before the social classes finally developed and their political oppositions emerged. They are characterized by national political thinking, and the class interest are only of second rank" (18). This was the most vital argument for the dreaming concerning the English-Hungarian comparison. By the 19th century the English were really over the national, social and religious shocks the Hungarian society passed only seemingly. This, historically minute coincidence served as basis of comparison and it is striking that how uncritically the sober Tisza handled this idea. Did he really think seriously, or he only wanted to think seriously that the Hungarian nation had its political unity before the processes of industrialization, and the related social fights had even started? We think that it is out of question in spite of the seeming similarities. Of course, we do not want to state that Tisza's whole policy was determined by such and similar mistakes. At any rate, the error in rate in this identification is one of the most important features of Tisza's portrait even in his period of reduced-pragmatic liberalism. This cannot be explained even by the sound psychological motives: "The great struggles of the constitutional development, the liberal progress are fought in both countries under the leadership of the landed aristocracy. The political parties are not organized according to social interests, and all of them is characterized by constitutional and liberal attitude" (19). The term "psychology" was deliberately used since Tisza does not study further the hidden politological motive, not to mention the advantages of this arguments for his ideas and his social position and standpoint (20). In Tisza's hand the English-Hungarian comparison becomes the credo and, at the same time, apology of this type of etatist liberalism: "There is a sharp difference between the Hungarian and continental liberalism. It is based not only on different parties but on the political unity of the whole national development, whole national existence. The national and state understanding is stronger, it is more sensitive to the demands of the great national and state aims to the society; it is actuated by a more active, devoted patriotism. It highly stands above the class struggles, and always refused the short-sighted policy of economic one-sidedness" (21). Tisza was not the only politician who bound the whole sphere of interest and future of the nation to some interpretation of the liberalism. Later we can discuss the smaller kind of theoretical sensation since Tisza, in the modern present, favours a liberalism that refuses both the "struggle of class interests" and the "economic one-sidedness", and thus composes a nation concept that not through the politological division of interests but disregarding it, still sticking to some concepts of liberalism tries to constitute the uniform concept of the nation.
Tisza also belonged to the group of the dualistic period who considered more important the awareness of and following the "invisible" preconditions, and hidden relations that the open and explicit public articulation of the political situation. That is why he sensed only late the large-scale changes of both the economy and demography, and globally that of the political medium, even if he, by recognizing this delay, first of all from the 1910s he did his best to turn to the public. Both in the less articulated, withdrawn period and in the course of open polemies his figure is of central importance in the whole Hungarian political life and especially in the polemic sequence about nation concept interpretations. Characterizing Tisza's standpoint it is important to spread light on the double-facedness of the theoretical-ideological articulation of the different attitudes. The fact that the elements of the political culture were rapidly splitting into "invisible" and "visible" moments led to a twofold consequence: on the one hand the group which was aware of the real situation of the dualist Hungary and had the relevant favourable information, and on the other hand the group of a heterogenous conglomerate that for diferent reasons were not in possession of the above informations emerged. This duality was manifested in all fields of the intellectual-political life, especially markedly in the systems of interpretation of national-concepts. The different nation concepts regarding both their theoretical-objective contents, and their political-propagandistic significance in the period well reproduced the dramatic duality of the "invisible" and "visible" moments. In Tisza's nation concept this duality appears in a specific way, and it is politologically of classical importance. The young Tisza, in his period, could overlook the united picture of the "visible" and "invisible" moments. Later, however, in lack of the open confrontation with reality his picture of the "invisible" sphere got fixed, even it became a self-content attitude. This, however, was recognized by Tisza already before 1914. He was well aware of the features of the joint Monarchy, or to the nationalities. He could not publicize his knowledge accumulated about the "invisible" sphere to the public, and that is why could not fully express his views in political life. Besides, he did not recognize the shifts of the important main points of this sphere and the emergence of completely new aspects.
Thus he became intellectually conservative for the representatives of the new ideas, even in several elements of his liberalism was not influenced, and for the other part of the society he often seemed an autocratic, aggressive politician whose motives could not be always understood. Beside the intitiations to increase the national independence within the monarchy, or even absolutizing it Tisza's nation concept could have stand on its feet without revealing the relations of the "invisible" sphere.This was some kind of a synthesis of the conceptual and pragmatic moments, and as such an occasional synthesis it had difficulties when reacting to the changes that appeared both in the flow of ideas and in the pragmatic conditions. "Mutatis mutandis" the practically basic problem of the Hungarian dualism was also characteristic of Tisza's nation concept, i.e. the extremely small space for action. Accordingly, in Tisza's case the ominous duality characteristic comprehensively of the whole dualist political life was exrtremely sharply manifested: the open and dynamic structures of a modern society were built on political-ideological fundaments where the "invisible" factors were the decisive ones, and latter these became even less visible for the representatives of later periods.
That is why Tisza's new type of activity, starting after 1910 is extremely interesting for us that, even by its mere appearance indicates a criticism of his former attitude. This activity was a result of the unexpected successes of the Hungarian literary and scientific progress of the beginning of the century (22). It was not aimed at solving partial problems. The challenges are considered as challenges to a new nation picture and attempted to answer this challenge with defining a complete national concept: "While in the past the problems of deity, belief, materialism were studied only a few philosophers, while in the past two centuries only a few really great philosophers appeared who dealt with solving the problems of life in a revolutionary way contradicting the traditions, today these problems became the object of the widest criticism and propaganda for the masses untrained and unprepared for handling these problems...all these problems, as toys, are scattered from the ideas of semieducated and uneducated periods" (23). This reflection of Tisza about the ideological picture of the society is as firmly combined with his nation concept as in case of the other representatives of this reduced-pragmatic liberalism. For him the basically changed intellectual universe becam important when it critically endangered his idealized and ideal-typical nation concept. Tisza was so surprised by this newly emerging situation that he considered all items of the past as a mere idyll: "By today the positive cornerstones of human thinking determined by respect disappeared that,even is they might have obstacled development, could preserve the mental equilibrium and peace of large masses. Today these cornerstones must be replaced by individual spiritual strength. Today, already, intellectual defence must be exercised against the intellectual weapons attacking the belief of mankind" (24). The new intellectual universe by spiritual media leads to social psychological symptoms. This is the transmission through which the intellectual events are important for Tisza's ideas concerning national policies. Since in other studies we amply discussed the processes of the beginning of the century making the absolute into relative (25), now we shall deal only with Tisza's perspectives. The idealistic reality of the modern society explicitely splitted the life of the nations of the new ages:"...the internal peace of nations and societies fall victims of the terrible bifurcation of the ideology (!). Whole nations are splitted into two hostile groups that may not understood each other any more. Hatred, hostility and fight will be prevailing among the two groups, and two hostile trends will torture the human spirit seeking for the truth. The two noblest instinct of the spirit, those seeking for god and knowledge, will get into contradiction". This description of the present shows Tisza's positive nation concept. The necessity of such an indirect argumentation is proved by the fact that Tisza only scarcely expresses his positive nation concept in an explicite form (26). Tisza's positive nation variant plays partly a constitutive role in forming his own policies, partly it embraces one of the wide-spread attitudes of the period, the behaviour and attitude that was then well understood, and that was also greatly characteristic. Tisza envisioned the nation as a united centre above classes. It does not mean of course, that as an outstanding pragmatic politician, he was not aware of the social manifoldedness of the society. In spite of this fact he stuck to the idea of the nation as unified reference centre to which the different layers and groups, beside preserving their identity, voluntarily cling. This voluntary gravitational trend, in Tisza's opinion, is significantly based upon intellectual understanding: on the value system of the nation as an intelligent, concrete and definable community. The two enormous problems constituting the basis of any nation studies here will be only scarcely manifested in sterile form because it would mean that an occuring interest range, theoretically (!), is the interest of each member of the nation. Tisza does not react to just the very fact that we mentioned in our studies as the competitive concept of the nation (27). If we should be obliged to model this concept, we should obtain a picture in which above the Heracleitic struggles of the great process all the participants of this struggle vividly preserve the concept of the nation above the particular he preserved. The other, also fundamental problem is that the nation, as general gravitational trend, includes complete systems of contents , the theoretical or quasi-theoretical articulation does not take place in the mind itself. Due to conceptional force the conflict system of the ingredients constituting the whole are not integrated while they are undoubtedly exactly known (28). Tisza's homogenous nation view the representation of the joint, gravitative reference system of the nation as different parts of the social room (Bourdieu) also bears the negative consequences of the two, roughly mentioned, fundamental problems. Tisza can hardly bear the nation "split into two hostile groups", and it is well known that this diagnosis with its dynamic shifts corresponded to the real situation of the society of the beginning of the century. These dualities are also present within the individual human soul, since the religious belief and the sciences get into hostile relationship. Though Tisza's diagnoses in this field proved to be far rigth this suggested solution is one-dimensional and simplifying. Defenders of the absolutistic values were also able to describe the situation of the presently splitted nation but they could not find a valid solution either. Tisza's proposal for the solution of this problem, i.e. concerning the splitting of the whole nation, was a particular middle course between the progressive and reactionary suggestions aiming at solving the intellectual crisis influencing also politics. He finds satisfactory some kind of manifestation of the traditional protestant behaviour for the constructive solution of the great ideological problems of the period since in the societies where "the ideology is determined by the protestant way of thinking...we can see that the phenomena of the internal synthesis are increasing between the two seemingly hostile groups" (29). It is not clear from the text which is the very state Tisza had in mind but for us it is superfluos to guess. The classic German idealism as a whole supports the rightousness of this relation that on a basis, much more unlevelled than that of the French society but intellectually among protestant conditions and traditions elaborated an equalizing and dynamically reconciliating trend, the Fichte-Schelling-Hegel-line (30). In an exemplary way, here Tisza does not argue by using the classical German idealism and it is significant from the points of view of both his individual philosophical culture and the general philosophical attitude of the nation. It is remarkable that Tisza does not think of any reformed version of protestantism, of protestant "modernism" but of the "eternal", always valid protestant behaviour: "In my opinion, the essence of protestantism, and its great mission in the history of mankind is not to deliver the church from certain misconducts...The essence is that it was a revolution against the dogmas, against the human authorities...( so - E.K.) the human mind can discover the internal unity and harmony between the religion and sciences in each higher-rank stage of development" (31). Two aspects of Tisza's argument is remarkable. The first is that this solution is completely erraneous concerning the real analyses, it is AB OVO essentially unacceptable. The other aspect is that Tisza, even in immanent spheres is so sure on the righteousness of his own evidence that he explicitely states the hypothetical real integrating function of the protestant attitude disregarding e.g. the theological or philosophical evidences of the Catholic or other churches, i.e. the evidences of those who perhaps accept his ideas but do not exactly have the very same system of evidences. Taking his own evidencies that "evident", not discussed in details, is characteristic also of Tisza's other manifestations including his nation concept as well.
The protestant solution as intervention between religious belief and sciences, that exceeds the intellectual division splitting the nation, in a vulgar form, inculedes methodological or subject elements of the modern sciences. In this sense, in the absolutely not modernizing protestantism concept of Tisza are "modernist" elements: "...is there, among all the dogmas, more inconceivable and absurd thing than this mathematical rule (the concept of infinitely great and small - E.K.) that we must believe (!) because we have to obey the force of mathematical logics, and it is also true for the everyday life if, in practice, we use the formula of the infinitely great and infinitely little" (32). Tisza's next thought connect the the religious belief and the theoretically modern sciences: "Every, so-called scientific system when turns to the fundamental problems of the origins of life, escape sciences, ceases to be an intellectual product, it becomes a phantome called theory or it is just dreaming" (33). The problematics of the foundation of the different scientific systems was really one of the possibilities of the mental processing of modern sciences with such intentions. The fact that this rather marked philosophical trend of the turn-of-the-century period is relatively unknown is the result and the
coincidence of several, individually indifferent historical events. This, however, should not let us forget about the great contemporary significance of this motive that led Tisza to the conclusion that he found his almost intact, traditionalist protestantism, without any modification, suitable for solving that extremist crisis that, also in his opinion might have caused an intellectual civil war. This structure, "pars pro toto", may be applied also ti Tisza's nation concept. From several aspects its diagnosis is also realistic, the answers are based on sound internal evidences, but the evidences are of a kind that are not necessarily obvious ebven for those otherwise share Tisza's views (34).
The force of evidences, the internal belief refusing even the methodologically required doubt is so strong in Tisza's case that after two references to modern sciences he takes a firm stand beside an extremist, traditionalist protestant attitude: "...if we want to separate the human science from the human scum even today (!), if we want to rise the human ideology into higher and cleaner regions even today (!), then we have to go back to the original source where love and nothing else was taught to us (!), where love was the true, only vital element of a whole life turned to be benefit of mankind and martyrdom for the benefit of the mankind" (35). No deeper gap is possible between diagnosis and therapy.
This trend can be felt all over through Tisza's nation concept and national policy. Considering the fact that the intellectual crisis shocking the society can be equalized with the basic challenge of Tisza's nation concept, the imaginary answer is surprisingly one-dimensional, and thus rather poor (35-36).
Sensing of the one-dimensional type solution of the "protestant-way" is diminished and also explained by Tisza's role as editor and author at the journal MAGYAR FIGYELŐ. His already two-faced appearance, obviously because of the divergence of the public is ambivalent: his documents concerning the national crisis with a protestant solution are addressed to church, i.e. to internal communities, and the MAGYAR FIGYELŐ,as some kind of negation of the journal NYUGAT attempted to gain the victory in the field of modern ideas. This explains, only however hardly, that the "opposite tolerance" why can be replaced by the "loyal", extremist intolerance in this case. Description of the intellectual crisis causing also national critical crisis, i.e. the diagnosis surprisingly agrees with the slogan for protestant community for their tolerant and intolerant manifestations aimed the public.
The theoretical study, entitled "Free Thinking" (Szabadgondolkodás) published in the MAGYAR FIGYELŐ is a significant paper related to the political career of the politician's second, decisive period: "If somebody, only even for a few years neglected the development of more radical intellectual trends, may wonder the basic changes that had taken place during this short period. Since it was only a short time ago when the traditions with the resuscitation of the history of the nation there were 'civil wars'. All participants wished to gain the support of the extremist youth. The situation now: The internationality based on atheistic and materialistic ideology appears more courageously and cyinically and want to extinguish the religious moral and the idea of the nation from the soul (mentality) of the youth" (37). Tisza's nation ideal, based on this quotation, is not endangered only by the general intellectual splitting of the nation but this process, directly, provokes contradictions between the (former) national and "anti-national" trends. From this time on the new occuring ideologemes for Tisza is accompanied by the principle that whereever he feels an antinational trend, he feels it AB OVO an enemy. The fact that this selection is not directly agreeable with the complex, dynamic ideology of the modern age, is obvious.
It is also obvious that this selection cuases the appearence of two identity models in the intellectual life. These, later, could function as really decisive selective principles (38). This national-antinational contradiction by which Tisza the 1890s, and also his MAGYAR FIGYELŐ, started his counter-attack against the whole complex of the representatives of the modern intellectual trends, and it brought along two rather unfavourable consequences.
We do not really know which was the more catastrophic as for the future. On the one hand, disregarding the related objective messages of the mentioned objective ideological hypothesis and also the self-image of his new own representatives he practically considers all the participants of this whole complex as anti-national. The political consequencencies mostly are not the subject of the present paper, however, these had to be recorded (39). On the other hand, that was perhaps more catastrophic. A real "iron-curtain" was established between the official (and Tisza-like "liberal") Hungary and the modern hungarian "also liberal" society and the modern social sciences.
We are to repeat that the explanation of the motifs basically challenging Tisza's nation concept must be considered also one-dimensional and, at the same time it well reflects the non-properly found ideology formed in the dualist age in the next period: "An ancient problem on mankind that in any proliferous period, it is liable to become conceived. In peaceful periods, favouring also the individual welfare the person becomes self-conceived, he becomes a purpose itself, and becomes a centre of his ambitions" (40).
Accordingly, in the background of Tisza's political ideology there is a disturbed harmony. From this world picture that can be reconstructed from his political practice we can say that ot was not harmonistic or universalist, though the conceptual schematism interpreting directly the reality is basically harmonical and universalist. At present, no typology of the political ideology of the period is available into which we could class
precisely this duality of Tisza's concept. At any rate, this division of the concepts fatally influenced also Tisza's policy making: after all, he used his excellent pragmatic abilities for purposes of the harmony. Thus, he starts with the approval of the official circles and the higher society partly to some extent hopeless, partly catastrophic fights from the points of view of the national interests, against all modern ideas, including, of course, the modern sciences achieving an extremely high standard at the period. He reasoned as follows: "Freedom of thinking, nowadays, of today's population is endangered from quite another side. It is the terrorism of semi-education fed by hypermodern slogans, that fills the palace of the modern culture...the semi-education, with its intolerance and self-conceitedness sweeps away any contradictions. We are to protect the freedom of the thinking against the freethinking" (41). Even at this point it is clear that in the name of the nation, Tisza is not able to argue with the new ideological streams. His arguments are merely the emphasizing of his own evidences.
In a narrower politological sense, and now we are to return to former sections of this study, this system of evidence consists of the acceptance of several relations, which, not to mention other groups, the young generations could hardly understand. Tisza gets in a situation that he could not really recognize, that he should represent in a new medium suddenly, an iceberg-size complex floating under the water, which is completely changed intellectual universe ought to have fight for its own truth. While Tisza himself declared the whole stream of modern intellectual ideas anti-national, he himself tells the public the deep crisis of the traditional nation concept (concretely that of the first period of dualism and valid in that period). He himself could not refer to anything but fading evidences the majority of which is limited to the "invisible" sphere of the political knowledge: "The whole mankind is asked a great question, bit this question is the most frightening for us, for our culture. We are to confess: we are on national stand. According to the hypermodern we are nationalists. They already are not speaking of national aspects but only of national prejudices. They do not care about the welfare of the whole mankind if it is not related to the development, flourishing and greatness of the Hungarian nation" (42). The identification of the contradiction of the modernity-traditionalism with the anti-national-national poles, as it was described above, proved to be fatal. The national point of view is not explicit, it is built on international and invisible evidences. Since, however, the related fixation, may it be based on different though not only condemnable motifs, has a complete moral and emotional priority, and the non-national modernity, based on this logics and becomes the source of all evils: "Our public is phantastically apt to take up decadent tendencies. Science, literature and arts became a free market for those who are rivalling in the fields of novelty, self-exposure, extraordinary features. All the symptoms of the declining Latin culture is reaching us in a wireless way. Our philosophers, sociologists, artists, and painters, in a maddish manner reproduce the pathological symptoms of the gravely ill French mentality...Here we meet the symptoms of decay and disintegration: it is, however the demolition of a national spirit of high traditions on a magnificent level. This, even in the course of pathological decomposition of the cells is testifying to its noble origin. Our poor decadents begin the life simply with the decay and indicate the secessional symptoms without deminishing the repulsive features of the sight by the former cultural values...it seems to me like the mild duck that, in ambitious monomania, imagines itself as a pheasant" (43).
The total perplexity, the similar ignorance, the firm belief in the own evidences characterize a politician in his own proceedings who was an outstanding personality in the practical policy, in its ethos. How unable he was to recompose his national evidence, is excellently shown in his study "Nemzet és társadalom" (Nation and Society, 1911) that starts with the permissive turn that against the "unifying national concept" the "social" concept is also valid on the basis that the "human nature includes both".
Even now, however, Tisza is not able to overstep, since in order to verify his nation concept he could not find valid arguments. At the beginning he refers to the greater moral standpoint of the national moral idealism: "...are not we at a greatly level above the ideology that in the course of the evaluation of mankind, in all historical struggles sees only the materialistic selfishment's rude shouldering, like that of a pigherd the life of which is spent among fierce fights along the manger?" (44) Accordingly, the modernity, the radical or socialist views, i.e. the anti-nationals consider people to be a pigherd but we do not wish to go into details. The other trend of his argumentation is simply optimistic concerning the reality: "...everything around us testifies to the prime-mover, maintaining force of the national ideology" (45).
Like with many other political ideologies, with Tisza also the first and second period of the dualism can be sharply and exactly distinguished. His intellectual evolution can be considered even an extreme negative example: in the second period he completely preserves the first period's evidences and routines, then he recognizes it and tries to do something against it in practice.
The ammunition of this practical activity, however, is nothing else than totally anachronistic mentality
of the first period.

NOTES

(1) The liberal ideology, after 1848, naturally undergoes also several other changes and, simultaneously, at certain fields, it is differentiated and becomes pragmatic. Independently of this fact, we are count with the liberal and its system of evidences as a decisive factor.
(2)The turn of the liberalism, after 1848, gains an independent, concrete contents in almost every chapter. Its essence is that due to becoming uncontrollable of the social processes, the state is to realize the possible aims of the liberalism. On the problem see Endre Kiss's "The Hungarian Philosophy between the Fall of Independence and the Compromise in 1867 (in: MAGYAR FILOZÓFIAI SZEMLE, 1984/1-2) and "The Hungarian Philosophy during the Absolutism" (in: FORRADALOM UTÁN, KIEGYEZÉS ELŐTT. Budapest, 1988). Since national state development was also one of the great aims of the period of Hungarian dualism, a liberalism that of course was not classic, can be considered also the unification of these two important tendencies. Not for sharpening this point but we are to cite one of the German political ideologist of the period who, AB OVO, could consider the nation only as conservative: "Wehe der Nation, welche nicht konservativ empfindet: sie traegt öffentlich zur Schau, dass sie unglücklich ist, dass ihre Geschichte nichts taugt und dass sie ihre Staatsmaenner für ausserstande erachtet, den verfahrenen Wagen unzerbrochen und unzerlegt aus dem Sumpfe und von des Abgrunds Rande hinwegzuführen. Wehe der Nation, welche eine liberale Partei duldet..." (Paul de Lagarde, AN DIE DEUTSCHEN. Berlin, n.y. p. 13).
(3)Robert A. Kann, ERZHERZOG FERDINAND-STUDIEN. München, 1976. pp. 121-122.
(4)MAGYAR AGRÁR-POLITIKA. Budapest, 1887. p.8.
(5)In this period first of all Gusztáv Beksics was the person who holds the problem on agenda so that not to discuss the fundamentals of the existing system. In a moderate manner, he even refers to the offence of the theoretical liberalism in case of the maintenance of the entails.
(6)MAGYAR AGRÁR-POLITIKA, pp. 8-9. (Accentuation by E.K.)
(7)The victorious, pragmatized liberalism, of course, in itself, in an imminent manner may become also easily harmonism. In Tisza's case this harmonism is manifested in the hardly articulated regions: in his protestant ideology and unbreakable personality idealism (Persönlichkeitsidealismus).
(8)The agrarian propaganda has never mentioned it.
(9)MAGYAR AGRÁR-POLITIKA, p. 12.
(10)MAGYAR AGRÁR-POLITIKA, p. 101.
(11)MAGYAR AGRÁR-POLITIKA, p. 102. - This statement of Tisza is important, since the most general and unavoidable tendencies of modernization were refused by masses just in the German history.
(12)MAGYAR AGRÁR-POLITIKA, pp. 62-63.
(13)MAGYAR AGRÁR-POLITIKA, p. 63. - Here we may not analyze the details of the social-psychological aspects of the German problematics, though in earlier studies we tried to handle it separately. Mentioning, however, the antipathy with Tisza we are forced to refer to Nietzsche's ressentiment concept that, according to Max Scheler, and we also share his opinion, in the greatest psychological discovery of the past century (VOM UMSTURZ DER WERTE. Abhandlungen und Aufsaetze., 4. ed. Bern 1955, p. 37). That is Scheler's particular problem that the author himself tries to limit the validity of this "greatest discovery", as for the religions.
(14)MAGYAR AGRÁR-POLITIKA, p. 64 (Accentuation by E.K.)
(15)The contrast against the "common enemy", the liberalism is present, as a version in the European political history from the 1850-1860s and their European coincidence is very important for understanding careers that of Albert Apponyi.
(16)MAGYAR AGRÁR-POLITIKA, pp. 102-103.
(17)MAGYAR AGRÁR-POLITIKA, p. 103. - The elaboration of the historical parallel between England and Hungary would require almost a complete monograph, here we are restricted to refer only at the most important motifs.
(18-19)MAGYAR AGRÁR-POLITIKA, p. 103.
(20) Tisza writes: "It is an eternal glory of the Hungarian feudal class that it itself eliminated its own privileges and it created the preliminary conditions of the freedom, welfare and flourishing of the other classes. Our brightest memories are bound to this struggle of our fathers, degenerate successors are who forget about it. This struggle cannot be called a stupid generousness that we pay by our financial decay for the benefits of others....where we would be now if by obtaining the political and economic freedom we could not get the 20 years' period of the revolutionary development during which our incomes were doubled..." (MAGYAR AGRÁR-POLITIKA, p. 106.)
(21)MAGYAR AGRÁR-POLITIKA, p. 108.
(22)Mainly A VILÁGNÉZET KORA. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE ABSZOLUTUMOKAT RELATIVIZÁLÓ
HATÁSA A SZÁZADELŐN. Budapest, 1982.
(23)"Protestant belief and enlightment", in: AZ UJSÁG, 3 November, 1911.
(24)Ibid.
(25)See 2.
(26)The main of the ideology-critical utilization of these few positive manifestations is that their compositions, due to the obviousness of the internal evidences they are often so trivial, that their exact quotation would offer a false picture about both Tisza's nation concept and also the level of way of thinking.
(27)The very reason of elaboration of the sound evidence and own standpoint is just this: "Tisza's nation concept starts from its own evidence as the only correct concept. The fact that others also might other positive, or even competitive nation concepts never occured to Tisza.
(28)Tisza's case also extremely interesting in our relations because he, as a practicing politician must have had
a plastic awareness of the motifs he had not integrated in his nation concept.
(29)"Protestand belief and enlightment" (Cited place)
(30)We refer to that, first of all, fact of the sociology of knowledge (Wissenssoziologie) that proved decisive in the development of the classical German philosophy after Kant. Kant's followers wanted to "unite", thus "reconcile" the philosophical branches splitted by the Kantian criticism just due to an intensive social expectation.
(31-32-33) "Protestant belief and enlightment" (Cited place)
(34)Thus Tisza's insuscebility to the communicative genre of the modern society based on consensus becomes clear that were, in their own way, amply discussed by the classics of the liberalism.
(35-36)"Protestant belief and enlightenment" (Cited place)
(36)This study just proves his idea that for the solution of the enormous crisis, indicated by himself, the protestant ideology is fully sufficient.
(37)"Free thinking" (in: MAGYAR FIGYELŐ I, 1911, Vol II. pp. 3-8, then in István Tisza's collected studies, Vol. I. p. 531.).
(38)It is characteristic that with Tisza the antagonism of the scientific and religious world concept becomes the duality of the national and anti-national attitude.
(39)Based on the above note we can generalize that any harmony between the modernity and the nation was unimaginable for Tisza.
(40-43)"Free thinking", p. 531, p. 533, p. 534 and p. 535, respectively.
(44)"Nation and society" (in: MAGYAR FIGYELŐ I, Vol. IV. pp. 281-293, and István Tisza's collected studies, Vol. I. pp. 611-622. Place of the citation from this latter: p. 620.
(45)"Nation and society", p. 621.