Only after these definitions had been elaborated was it possible to consider other concepts of positive political metaphysics in the history of philosophy and political ideologies. It must be noted therefore that the actual direction of the research work has been the very opposite of that taken by the argumentation of this study. It was not the case that the historical reconstruction of positive metaphysics has led us to examine a characteristically national socialist positive metaphysics as a specific instance of positive metaphysics, playing a particular role in world history. On the contrary, arguments produced in the course of this research were gradually extended and generalized in historical and systematic directions, but only when the outlines of a typically national socialitst political metaphysics had already been drawn up.
To a certain extent, the term 'political metaphysics' has been newly coined in the course of the research program described above. The term, however, is not completely new, since alternative usages have already occurred in the works of other authors. One may observe a suprising frequency of the term in works which could stand themselves as outstanding representatives of the notion of political metaphysics. The inclination to use this term may perhaps be best explained by its seeming neutrality and distance from everyday political practice, making its overt use possible.
The dissatisfying insufficiency of philosophical literature on the phenomenon of National Socialism was one of the main reasons why the reconstruction of the notion of political metaphysics seemed necessary. The 'irrationalism' concept expounded in György Lukács's Dethronement of Reason seems to be particularly frustrating, though it purports to be the ultimate explanation of national socialist or quasi-national socialist ideologies. This approach claims to be both comprehensive and essentialist, extensive and intensive. Until the present day its overwhelming dominance has hardly been challenged. It has managed to preserve its privileged theoretical positions through intricately interwoven connections and mutual affinities both in Western and Eastern Europe.2 Strictly speaking, 'irrationality' as such, that is 'dethronements of reason' in any sense, can only be recognized as secondary aspects of any given national socialist phenomena. No theory seemed to have been able to use the term in a thematically exhaustive fashion. As a theoretical explanation lacking philological evidence, it increasly becomes dangerously arbitrary. Moreover, inevitable consequences of the irrationality thesis have also thrown a rather critical and disadvantegous light on this approach. For it is important to note that the sudden and overpowering victory of an irrational Weltanschaaung, appearing almost irreversible for some time, necessarily leads one to assume a failure of collective consciousness which broad social groups, layers and classes are supposed to fall victim to, at least this is what the irrationality thesis claims. This assumption would have to be taken word for word and its import would have to be used in constructing a new paradigm of social psychology both from a scientific and historical point of view. This, however, does by no means imply that one should try to marginalize the significance of socio-psychological factors contributing to the national socialist seizure of power. Yet the point to make here is that a carefully considered irrationalism thesis, on the one hand, would inevitably lead to a considerably changed perception of social psychology, on the other hand, such thesis would disregard other important factors shaping history.3
The 'quasi-philosophical' nature of national socialist ideology, as well as the 'quasi-theoretical' nature of its contemporary and subsequent interpretations has also been readily perceived by everyday consciousness. This everyday consciousness was quick to locate national socialist rhetoric between the spheres of 'politics' and 'philosophy' both in Germany and elsewhere. The irrationalism thesis owns much of its success to its peculiar tendency to actualize this quasi-philosophical character of national socialist ideological practice (and assuming good-will on its part, this is why it could also be mislead). One form of this actualization was to regard national socialist ideological practice as through and through philosophical, furthermore, as an almost direct descendant of academic and universal philosophy. It was inevitable that many elements of the more or less right-wing pseudo-philosophizing, finding their way into the pseudo-philosophical discourse, would originally come from academic and universal philosophy. For this reason, it may not be completely irrelevant to weigh the responsibility of these philosophies. There are, however, strikingly few known researches or analyses which would have shown a satisfying level of precision and thematic thoroughness when studying the change that this philosophical discourse had undergone in terms of sociological class, environment and context.
Historically, the propaganda-campaign of World War I interestingly foreshadowed the peculiar character of national socialist pseudo-philosophizing. In the course of this campaign, the propaganda of the Triple Entente quickly detected philosophical and (to use the key word of this study) 'metaphysical' reasons behind the aims, intentions and motives of German warfare. Producing an extraordinary case of historical blindness, several representatives of the German intelligentsia have followed suit, constructing a series of specifically 'philosophical' reasons which were supposed to distinguish German warfare from the motivations of the enemy.4 The significance of this historical event can hardly be overestimated, considering the real impact of the entire World War I on the most important events of the 1920s and on National Socialism itself. This propaganda-war had also given birth to the language and argumentation that constituted the greater part of national socialist pseudo-philosophy. Therefore, these questions form an important chapter in the history of positive metaphysics and can be identified as immediate predecessors of the national socialist type of positive metaphysics.
The pseudo-theoretical character of national socialist (in a broader sense, right-wing) philosophizing had thus become an everyday experience of the masses much before the emergence of National Socialism itself. An independent inquiry in the field of the sociology of knowledge should target the exposition of many additional features of 'everyday theorizing' in a much more exact fashion than it has been done hitherto. The impact of this 'everyday theorizing' andžto proceed one step furtheržits influence on the shaping of reality was clearly observed by István Bibó, who in his study on the German problem called attention to the quasi-intellectual aspect of this political mass-rhetorics. As a remedy he suggested a general clarification of terms. For instance, he recommended that instead of race-alien (artfremd) the German media should simply say enemy, instead of drive towards the East (Drang nach Osten) plainly Berlin-Bagdad railway-lines.5 It is by no means a coincidence that this quasi-theoretical character of German political terminology (and consequently, that of political thinking) was soon recognized abroad as well. From a historical point of view, it was rather unfortunate and absolutely detrimental that the foreign view of Germany had already been focussed on the broad social role of theory in previous historical periods as well. The view of Germany formed by Madame de Staël, Heine or the young Hegelians had already drawn up these features with much precision. This was followed by a general interest in peculiarly German characteristics in the wake of 1871,6 and later, a similar interest in an empire of 'metaphysical' aims during the above mentioned propaganda-war in World War I. The real historical tragedy was caused by the fact that public opinion abroad could not appreciate the difference between certain attributes of the German image developed by the quasi-theoretical rhetorics of the 1920s, as opposed to those characterizing previous historical eras. Thus one was not able to give an adequate interpretation of the rhetorics of the Hitler-movement. This movement has relied on previous quasi-theoretical political foundations, but it intensified crucial elements of it to a formerly unknown extent.
The quasi-philosophical rhetorics of German politics has played a constitutive role in the development of par excellence national socialist ideology. The basic proposition of this essay is that this national socialist ideology is not to be subsumed under the notion of some kind of philosophical 'irrationalism', but under that of positive political metaphysics.
The notion of political metaphysics is a generalization of the sociology of knowledge. It acquires special significance not only by virtue of its typological importance in terms of the sociology of knowledge, but also because of the fact that the majority of the relevant national socialist philosophical and ideological material belongs to the category of positive metaphysics. Nonetheless, its ascension to a dominant position in the Third Reich does not stem from the thematic or structural aspects of positive political metaphysics, but rather, from a number of historical developments, to be discussed later.
Positive political metaphysics is not termed 'political', because it comes to being in the sphere of politics, but because its subject-matter is always directly and explicitly political, regardless of the actual outward form it may take. Schopenhauer's metaphysics of the will is the one and only instance of a modern non-political positive metaphysics, and it is no coincidence that there is scarce evidence of similar experiments. Some argue that it was his encounter with Schopenhauer that revealed the practical possibilities of positive metaphysics to Alfred Baeumler, the author of the par excellence national socialist positive political metaphysics (and the figure who was responsible for its historical triumphžan equally important point to note).7
Even readers who have professional interest in philosophy may perhaps be hesitant to appreciate the distinctive role of the phenomenon of 'metaphysics' in modern politics. Metaphysics is generally one of the most multifaceted objectivations, assuming innumerable forms in the history of philosophy. The most important and directly relevant aspect of this problem is the philosophical development that took place around the middle of the last century. During this period many new concepts of modern philosophy were born almost simultaneously, but even more importantly, all these emerged in the framework of a single discourse. (Schopenhauer's metaphysics of the will, identified above as the first and only example of a non-political positive metaphysics, Dühring's critical concept of metaphysics [as the 'other world' placed illegitimately beside the real world, becoming a part of the great philosophical tradition in Nietzsche's philosophy], several versions of the 'materialist metaphysics', which have attacked the materialism of natural sciences, and many new variants of idealist metaphysics. This should prove that alternative concretizations of the term 'metaphysics' have played a significant role in modern thinking, particularly in the sphere of everyday consciousness.)8
The most important characteristic of modern positive metaphysics (most versions of which are classified as political metaphysics in the sense defined above) is its preoccupation with ontological laws. This feature recalls Schopenhauer's archetypal positive metaphysics once again, since under modern scientific and social conditions Schopenhauer's metaphysics of the will seems even statistically unique in having stated ontological laws precisely in the way as they later came to be realized by the national socialist type of political metaphysics. The call for a new metaphysics which states ontological laws could be accepted from an isolated and abstract point of view, for this would mean nothing more and nothing less than injecting life into one of the most important aims of the universal philosophical tradition. From an isolated and abstract point of view, therefore, one would not disown a philosophical stance just because it aims to state philosophical law(s) of ontological status. However, the original metaphysics of Schopenhauer and national socialist positive metaphysics share another irrevocable or even fateful characteristic of this aspiration: the validity of the ontological law(s) supersedes the validity of science, history and politics. This means that the 'ontological law' acquires validity over science, history and politics, any one of these 'ontological laws' can overrule scientific, historical or political arguments. In short, the supreme ontological status of an ontological law can also be enunciated by a proposition that is scientifically unsound, historically incorrect, and contradicts general laws of political practice. Schopenhauer substantiates and explains this in full detail. At the same time, national socialist philosophical statements should be interpreted in their strict literal sense as deliberate utterances which expound anti-scientific, anti-historical and anti-political themes. These utterances (as well as other expositions of positive metaphysics) have long been simply regarded as instances of a distorted ideological rhetorics. No significance was attributed to the thematic content itself. The reconstruction of the notion of positive political metaphysics, however, could pinpoint the pseudo-theoretical content and intention of such statements: hostility towards science, history and politics is not merely a manifestation of a general 'irrationalism', but a logical, and peculiarly 'circumspect', legitimation of positive metaphysics, which consequently does not lack certain aspects of rationalism. This argument will then explain the following samples, chosen from a larger group of examples, all supporting the same point: "National Socialist politics is neither a rationally founded political ability, nor an experimental political activity[...] Ideas cannot be explained historically or psychologically... National Socialism is not able to find proofs, nor does it need to find proofs."9 An understanding of the three-fold negative attitude of positive political metaphysics to science, history and politics, as described above, immediately fills the rather confused text with meaning. First, the quote deprives 'National Socialist' politics of obvious and preeminent attributes of political practice ("neither ability, nor practice"). The question, of course, remains whether there is anything left in this way which still has something to do with politics, but a real answer to this question can only be arrived at after a consideration of the genuine and practical causes of this peculiar and seemingly incomprehensible hostility towards politics (after all, this attitude of hostility towards politics was adopted by a movement resorting to extreme political means). Nevertheless, it is clearževen if at this stage the true causes cannot be expoundedžthat there is a strong hostility towards politics, to do with the legitimation of positive metaphysics and ontological laws. The quotation, furthermore, warns that ideas "cannot be explained historically or psychologically". A great number of relevant questions are to be skipped to reach our conclusion. The relationship of the preoccupation with ontological laws to this open and explicit hostility towards science is unambiguous: the impossibility of explaining and elucidating ideas makes it impossible to check or verify the positive content of the ontological law. What the anti-scientific theses of the authors of the National Socialist 'principles' display is not an attitude of blood-thirsty, primitive irrationalism, but a peculiar calculus legitimizing the ontological law(s) of positive metaphysics. Finally, the same idea is once again expressed in the last sentence of the quote, which the English translation did not attempt to render more comprehensibly than the German original ("Nationalsozialismus ist keines Beweises faehig und bedarf keines Beweises"). Here, the antagonism of the ontological law(s) to science and history is shown simultaneously.
Not even the following exclamation of Hitler's Mein Kampf can be regarded as a merely accidental animosity towards reason and intelligence, but rather, as a requisite of positive metaphysics: "we must not poison infantile hearts with accursed 'objectivity'".10 This anti-scientific attitude is also a means for the legitimation of positive metaphysics. A particularly rare example of anti-scientific positive political metaphysics is Carl Schmitt's term, defining the essence of the "liberal nineteenth century" as "metaphysics in the disguise of science".11 The interesting point about this example is that Schmitt uses the term "metaphysics" in an inappropriate way, though he does so from the point of view of positive political metaphysics. Only in the conclusion of this essay will we address the question concerning the significance of the fact that the three-fold negative attitude, closely related to positive metaphysics, was so strongly present in Hitler's thoughts as early as the 1920s. At this point, the Third Reich's dominant political metaphysics-paradigm, based on Alfred Baumler's Nietzsche interpretation, had not yet appeared.12 One could cite countless examples of thematically political, positive metaphysical statements of an anti-political attitude from the sphere of science and philosophy in the nineteenth century, raising several questions concerning the history of positive political metaphysics. Droysen's words could serve as a classic example: "Things have their truths in the world of politics as well. This is the moving force of the life of states and peoples; their law is to be true...".13 The following statement by Gottfried Benn is also free of accidental 'irrationalism': "...the science of history needs supervision and control: one that stands on the grounds of the discipline of a healthy life [Gesundheitslehre]...".14 An understanding of the preoccupation of positive political metaphysics with ontological law(s) could help to interpret such, at first sight totally incomprehensible, national socialist utterances like that of the National Socialist periodical, Nazionalsozialistiches Bildungswesen: "Blood replaces Nietzsche's growth [Wachsen]...". The confusion of images will disappear as soon as the political metaphysics of "blood" (war in a metaphysical sense) is compared to a political metaphysics of "growth" (the system of the National Socialist Reich). Moreover, even the subject of change will be clear: the "metaphysics" of the preparation for war. This series of examples could be continued endlessly. They enable us to conclude that the hostility of national socialist rhetorics towards science, history and politics is a far cry from being the result of an undifferentiated and primitive irrationalism. This hostility is a direct consequence of the positive political construction.15
The analysis of the metaphysical character of positive political metaphysics should also contrast positive political metaphysics with other modern or even contemporary conceptions of metaphysics. Thus it is necessary to extend the scope of the discussion to the system of Eduard von Hartman, particular consideration should be given to Hegel's posterior intepretations of metaphysics, and Nietzsche's anti-metaphysical attitude. The anti-relativist "metaphysics", which aimed to grasp the philosophical absolute, as represented by the young Lukács may also be relevant, as well as Heidegger's metaphysics of being, or the pertaining metaphysical dimensions of the so-called "totalitarian metaphysics" of the 1950s. Needless to say, these philosophies are located in completely different spheres of the intellectual universe than positive political metaphysics. Yet there is little doubt that this century has witnessed a growing number of deliberate associations, as well as parallels and correspondences between these two areas, as they came to be defined by the sociology of knowledge. Alfred Baumler is the best example how metaphysical problems of 'high' philosophy and the broad social concept of positive political metaphysics can be juxtaposed.16
The positivity of positive political metaphysics is primarily based on its distinctive feature, namely that the metaphysical content is constituted by a this-worldly-positive and not an other-wordly-transcendent aspect.17 In addition, a concrete this-worldly aspect becomes the very foundation of metaphysics. This is the secondary constitutive element. Schopenhauer recognizes the will as the foundation of metaphysics, because he perceives it to be the real causality of the movement and determinations of everything that exists. Positive political metaphysics of the national socialist-type also chooses a this-worldly (i.e. non-transcendent) aspect to be the positive substructure of metaphysics. In the case of the national socialist metaphysics originating from Baumler, this aspect is embodied by the thoroughly falsified notion of the 'will to power' taken over from Nietzsche's philosophy. National socialist political metaphysics, however, is not merely building on the positive concept of the distorted Nietzscheian will to power, it is literally a receptacle and summary of all previous right-wing political philosophies produced by German history.18 The fact that positive metaphysics was to integrate thematically diverse alternatives is the true distinctive characteristic of national socialist ideology. Baumler's will to power in national socialist political metaphysics creates a coherent and organic unity of the metaphysics of 'blood', 'race', 'soil', 'Führer', 'order', 'state', 'empire', 'Teutonicness', 'community', 'struggle' and 'art'. Not only that each of these this-worldly concepts may be theoretically used as a foundation on which a positive metaphysics can rest, they have in fact been used for these purposes as well.19 The 'positivity' of political metaphysics is certainly connected to the consolidation of the leading role of positivist philosophy during the second half of the last century. While in Schopenhauer's work, the metaphysics of being was striving to define, legitimize and verify itself in a positivistic fashion, it is not uncommon to find positivist philosophical conceptions which ultimately arrive at a metaphysics of being. Social Darwinism is a standard example. It can be perceived as a vulgarized metaphysical version of a classic positivist-genealogical interpretation. But when properly interpreted, Herbert Spencer's 'fundamental principles' could fulfill the criteria of positive metaphysics as well.20 It is worth mentioning that the problem of positivist theory-building is a far richer and more differentiated problem than what we believe it to be today. Thus an explicit or implicit positivist 'theory-building', which is not sufficiently critical of itself, can often be seen to transmute into a conception of positive metaphysics. Though this argument offers an important new perspective, I would not like to accuse positivist theory-building of an inherent disposition to the creation of positive metaphysics. This would amount to no less than replacing one fetish with another, the phantom of positivism taking the place of the phantom of irrationalism.
The true political function of positive political metaphysics is legitimation. This fact in itself has theoretical significance, since it was almost inconceivable in the history of modern legitimations that an ideology with such structure could fulfill this function. Karl-Heinz Bohrer appropriately refers to the demand for 'laying the metaphysical foundations' of the new system. He does not, however, associate this demand with the analysis of positive political metaphysics.21 The legitimizing function is primarily based on the tendency of positive political metaphysics to annihilate individual freedom by its own particular means. Thus positive political metaphysics renders every alternative legitimation irrelevant, if these rely on the notion of individual freedom. The reason being that ontological law(s) of metaphyisical validity constitute a conception of the world in which (and against which) neither the individual, nor even larger political groups are able to take independent action.
It will perhaps be argued that this association of positive political metaphysics with the annihilation of the freedom of the individual is a posterior reconstruction and ideological criticism with a hindsight. But let us read attentively Friedrich Schmidt's definition from 1939: "The new notion of freedom of National Socialism...requires a preliminary binding of human existence and essence to the untouchable and eternal laws of creation."22 Friedrich Schmidt, however, goes even further in explaining what he means in the text quoted: "The highest notion of the freedom of man lies in his readiness to choose death for the sake of the nation's eternity."23 In the first definition of positive metaphysics Friedrich Schmidt makes use of the concept of 'creation', which is a crucial element, in view of the general hostility of National Socialism to Christianity. An even more important aspect of the text quoted above is the way in which the themes of 'freedom' and 'positive metaphysics' are being identified. Needless to add, this amounts to the immediate extinguishing of all practical freedom. Per definitionem, one cannot argue against a world-order that operates as an ontological law. It is equally useless to attempt rational action against it. One simply cannot conceive any argument that could substantially contest a metaphysics of such constitution.24 Positive political metaphysics assigns a status of law to the set of relations which move its world-order. One can, for instance, disagree with a positive metaphysics based on Baumler's will to power, but one cannot relativize its validity by available scientific, historical or political considerations. By definition his arguments cannot be relativized. Thus the ontological law(s) is 'carried out' by human actions, and human actions have no alternative but to embody the will of the ontological law(s) (to the analogy of Schopenhauer's system, in which the 'dancing' of the individual carries out the pre-arranged choreography of the metaphysical will which is of ontological status). If one projects this argument to a certain level of political reality, it will be more comprehensible why the masses have become, in a sense, defenseless victims of a modern and diabolically well-organized propaganda, which relied on the intellectual structures of positive metaphysics to an unprecedented extent.25 For it is literally impossible to find a logical-substantial, moral or even anthropological bulwark against positive metaphysics, so that intellectual opposition would be at least possible. The individual is an anonymous actor in the great currents, i. e. realizations of ontological metaphysics in the actual social and political context. An in toto rejection may be of the highest moral and intellectual standard. Its real flaw, however, in the given historical situation is that it cannot lay the groundwork for constructive analytical arguments, nor can it foster alternatives of practical opposition.26
This claim seems to be contradicted by the quasi-individualism and hero-worship of mature national socialist positive political metaphysics. On the one hand, this 'individualism' of national socialist political metaphysics is to be attributed to its anti-bolshevic attitudes, on the other, it is an inevitable and concomitant phenomenon of the militant mobilization of society. Nevertheless, a closer look at the portrayal of great personalities of history in national socialist political thinking reveals the pervasive presence of political metaphysics. Eduard Spranger was an important bourgeois scholar and philosopher, who was willing to compromise with the Third Reich, though he was not a true national socialist himself. As late as 1943 (that is, after Stalingrad) he depicted the figure of Friedrich the Second (i.e. Friedrich the Great) as follows: "Friedrich realized that something greater [etwas Grösseres] had been unfolding in him and had struck its roots in the depth of his soul... His deeds were to prove that history is superior to the individual, seizing the individual and harnessing him in its movement."27 This is supposed to be the description of Friedrich the Great, whom the Third Reich otherwise listed among the agents of a successful expansive German politics, that is, certainly an outstandingly active historical personality. Positive political metaphysics, thoroughly present in Spranger's text, degrades even the most successfully active figure of German history28 to be a mere executive, almost a mere instrument of the 'ontological law(s)'. For it turns outžstudying Spranger's text furtheržthat Friedrich realizes "something greater" unfolding in him, his deeds proving that history is "superior to the individual" that does not only seize the individual, but even "harnesses" (einspannen) him in its own movement. In more common language, it is not the individual (not even Friedrich the Great) making history, but the ontological law(s) asserts itself in the activity of historical agents. In the present case this agent happens to be Friedrich the Great. It is another question that Friedrich the Great is granted an 'awareness' (the possibility of an awareness) of this, while other subjects of history have not even been capable of this much. This text, along with many similar ones, prove that the quasi-individualism of national socialist rhetorics does not at all relativize the most important consequence of political metaphysics. On the contrary, it also degrades the individual to be a completely insignificant part of history. Gürther Hartung, analysing documents about tragedy, has made an important contribution to the study of the relatonship of ontological law(s) and situational quasi-individualism by calling attention to the 'ontologization' of tragedy, meaning the removal of tragic heroes to the sphere of 'timeless being'.29 This is, of course, only one instance of the clear manifestation of the intellectual system of positive political metaphysics. It is also present in the main argument of Werner Daubel's work The German Path to Tragedy from 1934: "All tragedy is heroic. But the converse is true as well: all true heroism is the appearance of the tragic [das Tragische]."30 The sense of tragic defined by this sentence is certainly tantamount to a tragic ontological law regarded as positive metaphysics, since true heroism is one of its 'appearances'. The problem of the 'leader' is closely tied up with this theme. He is the only person who can, both in the figurative and literal senses of the word, 'shape' history and who can thus become identical with the ontological law of positive metaphysics. In other words, Baumler's positive metaphysics of the 'will to power' and the metaphysics of the 'leader', already amply developed, are at this point united. This is an unmistakable example of the remarkable ability of national socialist positive metaphysics to incorporate all previous positive political metaphysics. Ernst Bolte wrote the following about the leader in 1933: "One who was born to be a dictator is not subject to compulsion, he wills [himself]..."31
It can be concluded thus far from the analysis that through its ontological law(s) positive political metaphysics, relying on given positive themes, draws up the outlines of a universal order of being. Though at varying levels of concreteness, all political metaphysics project their co-ordinates on being. These are the co-ordinates by which the concrete ontological law(s) unfolds its respective essence, always remaining superior to science, history, politics and the individual. It is at this point where one can identify the most important shortcoming and the real deficiency of theories trying to explain National Socialism with the concept of 'irrationalism'. For regardless of the actual characteristics associated by the sociology of knowledge with various ideological constructions, it is precisely this positive order that the irrationalism theories are not able to account for, and are consequently unable to analyze. The fact that this universal order of things is presented by positive metaphysics as a form of rationalism, relativizes the thesis concerning the prevalence of irrationalism from a new perspective.32 This positive order is embodied in concrete institutions in accordance with the ontological law(s). It is the reality of this order, directly founded on the ontological law(s), in the face of which the individual is rendered hopeless, since he is not in touch with this great order, neither in the practical nor in the intellectual sense, and therefore, his activity can never be connected to the constitutive aspects of this order. The idea that the entire reality is a universal order based on the substantial aspect of positive metaphysics is not a heuristic conclusion of a posterior analysis and ideological criticism. On the contrary, this is a commonly used form of expression of positive metaphysics. It is not absent from Spranger's above quoted portrayal of Friedrich the Great either: "[Friedrich] was certain that he was a bound [gebunden] member of an order, in which he was reckoned with."33 But the most mature and historically most influential positive metaphysics of Alfred Baumler states this at a number of points as well: "Reality lies in infinite depths beneath the superficial world of consciousness. This world is not that of chaos, but that of the well-arranged world of the will to power."34 Due to its substantive characteristics, positive political metaphysics, therefore, must inevitably entail a conception of order superior to history, politics, science and the individual. The very assumption of this order lies beyond the concepts that approach National Socialism through the thesis of irrationalism. Carl Schmitt is in the main associated with the sphere of political theology, though he embraced several elements of political metaphysics, especially after 1933. It is no coincidence that he emphatically called for "concrete ideas of order and form [konkretes Ordnungs- und Gestaltungsdenken]".

In the Third Reich, for the first time in modern political history, a specifically positive political metaphysics has become the legitimizing and integrating ideology of a state. Obviously, political metaphysics never fail to have a legitimizing function with respect to certain trends and actions, yet the case of the Third Reich can be perceived as a general novelty. The legitimation of 'deviance' has found itself in the role of justifying the 'whole'. It was demonstrated that under special circumstances political metaphysics is indeed capable of such legitimizing function. In addition, national socialist political metaphysics was also shown to be capable of acting as a receptacle for all previous versions of political metaphysics. Therefore, it is no surprise that positive metaphysics was able to legitimize virtually every political measure taken by the Third Reich. It could not have claimed success in terms of the sociology of knowledge, if the population of the Third Reich had simply interpreted the Baghdad railway as a manifestation of the 'Drang nach Osten'. It can be said to have been genuinely victorious because this population was ready to accept an order in which the Baghdad railway was identical with the 'Drang nach Osten' from the very outset. Potential criticism by everyday consciousness is inevitably doomed to failure in the perpetual silence of the well-ordered world-scheme of positive metaphyics.
In a reconstruction of the notion of positive political metaphysics one should certainly include the discussion of the concepts of political theology and political mythology as well. At present, theoretical inquiries in these subjects quite frequently assume that all three concepts grasp the same phenomena. The terminology is even more hesitant.
I would certainly argue that from a thematic and quantitative point of view, the most clearly defined among these three concepts is the notion of positive metaphysics, this is the concept that also figures in this work. I suggest that the term political theology should be used to label concepts that strive for a Catholic, universalist and 'theological' re-organisation of modern society. Thus the work or the most important conceptions of Donoso Cortes, Max Scheler and Carl Schmitt can be constructively regarded as political theology. Moreover, Carl Schmitt's thinking is a good example of how political metaphysics can be accomodated within a general political theology. Schmitt's view of the 'friend-enemy relationship' as the 'essence' and 'criteria' of all politics fulfills the definition of positive metaphysics, primarily in terms of that part of the definition which referred to the preoccupation with ontological law(s). This could possibly be applied to other instances of Schmitt's thinking as well.35 There are, of course, equally adequate alternative definitions of political theology, Henning Ottman's definition, for instance, would include in this category all salvationist-teleological aspects of any philosophical stance in history.36 In a somewhat more general sense one could use the term political theology to signify political conceptions of religious orientation, in the argumentation of which 'theological' aspects play a more notable 'political' role, even though the interrelationship of the two spheres do not create a new category in terms of the sociology of knowledge. A good example could be the early Christian socialism of Bishop Ketteler.
The concepts of modern political mythology have been coined in order to provide a conceptual characterization of the phenomena which are described in this study with the notions of political metaphysics. Instead of the structural analysis of political metaphyics, this approach focuses on the archaic, mythological aspects of certain key themes. Thus Ernst Cassirer's important work spends little time on conceptual analysis, concentrating on the identification of the archaically irrational aspects of National Socialist political thinking.37 This is how a left-wing polemic version of the concept of political mythology was created, reshaping and politicizing 'mythologies' with a directly anti-nationalist and socialist motivation. It has done so, however, without ever calling for the development of a more complex and analytically elaborated concept of political mythology.38 One of the most important and most precise concepts of political 'mythology' was expounded by George Sorel, who has defined this notion in the following way: "...it is a certain arrangement of images which are capable of inducing sentiments that correspond to the various manifestations of war that socialism wages against modern society... By evoking the most intense memories of various conflicts, it [the general strike] fills all details of the picture available to the mind with erupting life. Thus we attain an intuition of socialism that language is not able to express with perfect clarityžand we attain it as a whole perceived in an instance."39 From a philosophical perspective, as well as from that of the sociology of knowledge, the remarkable significance of the concept of political mythology is not only provided by its systematic reference to Bergson, or by its modern political relevance. Nonetheless, I do not judge it to be sufficiently elaborated in terms of the points offered by this analysis. Primarily, Sorel's political myth is of a polemic and tentative character. It is not intended to analyse actual ideologies, on the contrary, it aims to reshape the image of socialism and change its intentionality in a polemic fashion. As such, in spite of its enormous significance, it is not a scientific notion of an analytic nature. Therefore, in sharp contrast to the concept of political theology, I do not consider the comprehensive concept of political mythology to be of exceptional relevance. This category is certainly suited to a characterization of important and even distinctive traits of modern political ideologies, but I am unable to single out ideologies, the 'mythological' character of which could be termed decisive. This 'mythological' character in itself is never sufficient to identify a distinct group in terms of the sociology of knowledge.


NOTES

1 Previous studies by the author on the same subject: Nietzsche, Baumler avagy egy pozitív fasiszta metafizika problémája [Nietzsche, Baumler or the problem of positive national socialist metaphysics]. In: Valóság, 1982. 9. (in German: Annales Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestiensis, Sectio Philosophica et Sociologica, vol. XVI., 1982); Társadalom és történelemlélektan. Bibó István történelemmagyarázata [Society and psychology of history. István Bibó's interpretation of history]. In: Valóság, 1984. 9.; Fasizmus és irodalom [National Socialism and literature]. In: Nagyvilág, 1985. 7.; Positive faschistische Metaphysik als Grundstruktur faschistischen Denkens. In: Traditionen und Traditionsuche des deutschen Faschismus. Halle/Saale, 1987.; Történelemelmélet és aktualizálás. Viták Nagy Frigyesrol [Theory of history and actualization. The debate on Friedrich the Great]. In: Világosság, 1987. Aug-Sept. and Zum Begriff der positiven politischen Metaphysik. In: Recht-Politik-Gesellschaft. Wien, 1988.

2 It is worth noting that the Dethronement of Reason was through and through accepted by the Western Marxism of the 1960s and 70s. Thus one can pursue a specific study of the connections of post-Stalinism and Neo-Marxism through this work in an extremely important thematic context.

3 Immediate reflections on the national socialist rise to power were naturally focussing on socio-psychological aspects. These were in one way or another incorporated into several different theories: into a theory of "political mythology" by Ernst Cassirer (Der Mythos der Staates. Philosophische Grundlagen politischen Verhaltens. Zürich & München, n.d.), into a Freudo-Marxist theory by Wilhelm Reich, into a critical social theory in the great work of Adorno and Horkheimer.

4 The main thesis runs as follows: "It is peculiar that when foreigners philosophize over the present war, they always return to the same idea: the war of 1914 is Nietzsche's war... This claim, apart from the unjustified assumption that we alone wanted the war, is not incorrect." (Sombart, Haendler und Helden. Berlin, 1915. p. 54.) In addition to expounding how the phenomenon of metaphysics has become a distinctive trait, it may also be worth noting the specific consequences of this process. For instance, Alfred Weber, a social scientist, complaining about the marginal influence of intellectual leaders has come to the conclusion that this is to be attributed to the greater depth of vision with which the representatives of German intellectual life have studied the modern structure of being (Alfred Weber: Die Bedeutung der geistigen Führer in Deutschland. In: Der neue Rundschau, 2. vol., 1918, p. 1254).

5 Cf. Társadalom és történelemlélektan. Bibó István történelemmagyarázata [Society and psychology of history. István Bibó's interpretation of history] by the author.

6 The intense contemporary French reception of the works of Wagner, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche is also explained by the heightened interest in Germany induced by the events of 1871.

7 Baumler was deliberately experimenting with a conception of political metaphyics. He made interesting attempts in this direction in his study on Bachofen. At that stage, he judged Nietzsche's work to be unfit for the purposes of a general reform of modern metaphysics.

8 There is a multifaceted and complex relationship between everyday consciousness and positive political metaphysics. This relationship is motivated by modern political rhetorics, and war propaganda in particular. Focusing on the 'normal' functioning of everyday consciousness, the most important point to be made is that everyday consciousness defines itself in an utter confusion of scientific, technological, natural and other 'laws', so it seems most plausible from its specific point of view that being as a whole has a positive law as well. This is why everyday consciousness has also recognized itself in Schopenhauer's philosophy. On this aspect of Schopenhauer's philosophy, that is, its close links to everyday consciousness and its exaltation of the latter to a philosophical level cf. Endre Kiss: Arthur Schopenhauer filozófiai 'discours'-ja [Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophical 'discourse']. Valóság, 1988. 10.žThe inability of everyday consciousness to think systematically and critically, as I have noted in another work, can also be related to this point.

9 Friedrich Alfred Beck-Josef Wagner: Hochschule für Politik der NSDAP. Ein Leitfaden. München, 1935. Cited by Poliakov: Léon and Wulf, Josef, Das dritte Reich und seine Denker. Berlin-Wien, 1983. p. 44.

10 Adolf Hitler: Mein Kampf. München, 1942. p. 124.

11 Carl Schmitt: Die politische Theorie des Mythus. In: Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar-Genf-Versailles. 1929-1939. Hamburg, 1940. p. 12. According to Schmitt, discussing (diskutierend) liberalism is also characterized by 'metaphysical cowardice'. From the point of view positive metaphysics (which only represents one aspect of Schmitt's position) this claim is, in fact, correct.

12 This correspondence well demonstrates how many different sources can be associated with the concept of positive political metaphysics. A more or less complete discussion of the history of this line of thinking is yet to be written.

13 Johann Gustav Droysen: Friedrich der Grosse. Leipzig, 1874. p. 5.žThere existed a quite well-known letter by Moltke after 1871 that described war as "an element of the divine world-order" and as "the source of everything great and noble".

14 Gottfried Benn: Sein und Werden. 1935.žIn his review of the work of the national socialist Evola, Benn has also expounded a theoretically precise, radically anti-historical conception of political metaphysics: "In this notion [die Traditionswelt-K. E.] cultures get rid of the human [!] and historical [!], transferring the principles of their genesis onto a metaphysical plane [!]..." Neither does Benn hesitate to draw conclusions, which are of actual relevance and pertinence to the present, from this reflection on the pre-historical 'traditional world': "There are two orders, a physical and a metaphysical, two natures: a lower and a higher: the lower is becoming [!], the higher is being."žThus of course, he reveals one of the most important, directly pragmatic aims of positive political metaphysics: the assumption that there is a metaphysical distinction immediately divides society into two parts with unequal rights. The consequences only depend on the 'ontological law'...

15 Obviously, it is possible that many who have used this rhetorics were not fully aware of this reconstructed positive political metaphysics from the point of view of the sociology of knowledge.

16 Bauemler's biography is very interesting in this respect (my thanks go to the German scholar, Detlev Piecha for several interesting facts). An academic, who studied (and falsified) the works of Schopenhauer, Bachofen and later Nietzsche, took part in street fights before 1933, thus uniting the positive metaphysics of philosophy and that of the streets (and let us also add, that of the pub as well).

17 Three different phases can be distinguished taking an ideal-typical simplification of the history of metaphysics: the area beyond reality directly or indirectly referring to something transcendent; all 'other worlds', posited next to the existing, appearing as metaphysics; and positive metaphyics, in which reality is not any more an epiphenomenon of a given transcendence, but that of a positive metaphysics of this world.

18 The fact that German history has been characterized by the opposition of large segments of society to the great trends of modernization is related to this proliferation of positive political metaphysics (though one must, of course , also consider wars and other known peculiarities of German history). Already at an early stage, these social groups have often expressed their Weltanschauung in various conceptions of positive political metaphysics.

19 A classic example of the metaphyics of the 'community': Beck-Wagner, l.c.; of the positive metaphyics of the 'higher order': Poliakow-Wulf, p. 63.; of the metaphyics of art: Gottfried Benn, Die Zeit, 1986, 9. He talks about the artistic evangel of art as the ultimate European metaphysics. Clearly, this implies a 'step back' from Benn's metaphysical stance of 1935, but this is not
incomprehensible.žAn outstanding example of national socialist political metaphysics as a synthesis of all previous political metaphysics is provided by Hermann Ley's following statement: "These natural laws are unchangeable, the laws of blood, race, energy, courage, heroism, motherhood are all eternal." (cf. Poliakow-Wulf, p. 18.)

20 I have discussed the relationship of positivism and the alternatives of theory-building in my paper held in Kirchberg (Austria) in 1988: Über positivistische Theoriebildung. The alternatives of positivistic theory-building include all the movements that, deliberately or not, have tried to direct positivism towards a positive metaphysics-building.

21 Karl-Heinz Bohrer: Die Aesthetik des Schreckens. Die pessimistische Romantik und Ernst Jüngers Frühwerk. Frankfurt am Main-Berlin-Berlin-Wien, 1983. p. 484.ž cf. Endre Kiss: Érzékelésesztétika és modernség [The aesthetics of sensation and modernity]. Bohrer: Die Aesthetik des Schreckens. Filozófiai Figyelo, 1987. 3-4.

22 Friedrich Schmidt: Der neue Freiheitsbegriff. In: Odal, Heft 5, 5., Mai, 1939. p. 319. Also cited by Poliakow-Wulf, p. 62.

23 Ibid. p. 63žSchmidt seems to have an infinite number of ideas at hand to define the notion of freedom in terms of political metaphyics. Another example: "...the German man is only free to the greatest extent when he is ready to subordinate himself to the bounds of a divine order." (Ibid., p. 62.)

24 The world-order constructed this way does not offer a fixed point on which substantive argumentation could be build. It is literally and in manifold ways totalitarian.

25 This is, of course, only one aspect of the problem of responsibility. It is not sufficient to create the basis for a possible general and moral dispensation.

26 The conceptual difficulties of an in toto rejection (once again, treating this as one aspect, and not as a universal explanation) surfaced in the problems of the anti-Hitlerite internal and external resistance, as well as in the dilemma of the so-called 'zero hour' (die Stunde Null). That is, they have acquired pragmatic significance as well.

27 Eduard Spranger: Der Philosoph von Sanssouci, Berlin, 1943. p. 50 ("Friedrich wurde sich dessen gewahr, dass etwas Grösseres durch ihn hindurchlebte und im Grunde seiner Seele Wurzel geschlagen hatte...Er musste durch die Tat beweisen, dass die Geschichte eine überindividuelle Macht ist, die den einzelnen ergreift und in ihre Eigenbewegung einspannt.")žSpranger lays special emphasis on the metaphysical character of the positive metaphysical aspect which asserts itself through the individual in history. Obviously, he aims to use a language that he regards as specifically national socialist, as late as 1943: "The weights which have moved Friedrich the most were of a metaphysical character." (Ibid., p. 50. my italics, K. E.)

28 My study on Friedrich has concluded that the most important element in the uninterrupted cult of Friedrich was probably the aspect of historical success. This should demonstrate the 'anti-political' attitude of political metaphysics even better, since not even in Friedrich's case was the eminent historical success supposed to be brought about by the actual play of real political forces, but by the 'self-assertion' of positive metaphysics.

29 Günter Hartung: Faschistische Tragiker im Verhaeltnis zu Schiller und Paul Ernst. In: Weimarer Beitraege, 30. (1984), p. 11.

30 Werner Deubel: Der deutsche Weg zur Tragödie. 1934. p. 6.

31 Ernst Boepple: Adolf Hitlers Reden. München, 1933. p. 118.

32 Obviously, the 'rationality' of this order can only be interpreted in a particular context. Nonetheless, whatever the context, this system is not 'irrational'.

33 Spranger: Der Philosoph von Sanssouci, p. 52.

34 Alfred Baumler: Friedrich Nietzschežder Philosoph und der Politiker. Leipzig, 1931. p. 53. (my italics, K. E.)

35 It is possible to interpret the distinction between the notions of 'substance' and 'instance' in Schmitt's political theory as elements of a conception of political metaphysics. Likewise, a fully developed Führer-metaphysics appears (after 1933) in Carl Schmitt's work (for instance, he derives the power of judges from the similarity of their position to that of the 'leader', and not conversely, which is a shocking example of the distinctive legitimizing function of political metaphysics.)

36 Cf. Ottman's lecture at the 1988 conference on Carl Schmitts politische Philosophie (Dubrovnik).

37 The indeterminateness and generality of political mythologies from the point of view of the sociology of knowledge is palpable in Cassirer's descriptions (l.c. p. 364) of the alternation of the society's 'mythical organization' and 'intelligible order', during which magical elements can be revived any time under the surface of modern civilization. Clearly, this approach says little about the structure of political mythologies from the point of view of the sociology of knowledge. Political mythology appears in a similar way as a synonym of the drama of modern history in the work of Leo Gabriel, though admittedly, this notion of political mythology is replaced by an alternative conception of metaphysics conforming to positive science (Wort und Sein. Eine Stellungnahme zum 'Brenner'. In: Die Furche. 26 April 1947)

38 For a discussion of such an attempt cf. Albrecht Betz: Politisierung eines Mythos. Jeanne d'Arc als 'Simone' bei Brecht und Feuchtwanger. In: Realismus-Konzeptionen der Exilliteratur 1935-1941. Hamburg, 1988.

39. Georges Sorel: Über die Gewalt. Frankfurt am Main, 1969. p. 145.