Philosophy of the Present, and Meta-Philosophies

Endre Kiss

Summary

We are trying to present a way we think is optimal for making meta-philosophies. Our approach starts from actual philosophical and historical progress (it indicates the way and importance of neomarxism, structuralism, and post-structuralism in the near past), and it settles at a characterization of two comprehensive philosophical imperia of neopositivism/neoliberalism. We think, a meta-philosophy shall be grounded by a mutual analysis of these two great complexes. Our paper does this mutual analysis on the basis of symmetric relations; for this reason, it grounds a possible theoretical view of conceptual symmetry. An analysis of the conceptual symmetry of neoliberalism/neopositivism and postmodernism leads to the formulation of the most important basic principles of a possible new and timely meta-philosophy. At both great philosophical complexes, basic features which make symmetry possible, lie in a special distribution of “open” and “closed” features of philosophies.

We consider neomarxism the integrating philosophical trend of the sixties; strongly rises beside it (sometimes amplifying it, sometimes polemically with it) the great promise of structuralism, which promises a radically new model of science that would also have eminent philosophical consequences. Of course, right from the start, these two giant integrating trends motivate other trends as well. At the end of the sixties, but especially in the mid seventies, philosophical neomarxism ceased to exist with a blow of a natural disaster, and structuralism also announced its aspirations were impossible to proceed, in a correct and open manner unprecedented ever since. There comes a philosophical vacuum, in which two factors seem to be defining from the start: one basic fact is, that there is a philosophical vacuum, but not a ‘philosopher-vacuum’. This means, in this new situation, each group of thought-producers is being placed already in a pre-defined structural position from the beginning, and the act of filling the vacuum itself grows mainly from the fight of each relevant group of philosophers (moreover, scientists or even politicians of philosophical relevance) starting from these positions. Therefore, intellectual-political position (actually position of intellectual power) often christallizes before a new philosophical standpoint. On the other hand, following from the nature of this philosophical vacuum (partly from determinations of the two most important declining trends, partly from determinations of other environmental conditions), it shall be filled only with meta-philosophical ideas, as in the circumstances given, it’s unimaginable to find any “normal paradigm” which could fill the vacuum of this double decline in a naturally dynamic way.

Structuralism and neomarxism had not completely filled out philosophical space preceding postmodernism, not even in their decline which took place not much later. Yet this doesn’t mean we should list further trends here, for other relevant trends (most of all fenomenology and existentialism, but in some contexts even Stalinist Marxism) had already been built into the unity of intellectual issues of structuralism and neomarxism so deeply and multiple times, that in this starting situation they couldn’t appear in their original, “pure” form, but only tightly and polemically interwoven with structuralism or neomarxism (or both).

A shattering attack fit into an ideology-critical system, against knowledge and all traditional forms of its constructions, proved to be a most important field so far, for postmodernism to manifest itself. The magnitude and intensity of this relativization activity can be stated accurately if we compare it to the ideology-critical approach of Karl Mannheim. On the way of making forms and articulations of knowledge relative, mature postmodernism has exceeded the sphere of “ideology”, the most extreme “suspicion of ideology” imagined by Karl Mannheim a great deal; criticism of “ideology” got exchanged by criticism of “logo-centric attitude”. All these characteristics typical of postmodernism in general also mean for postmodern philosophy of science, that the basic thesis – as postmodernism is a beneficiary of structuralism’s often perspectivically unconsidered destruction against so-called normal science – is being justified at this point as well. Moreover, here too, postmodernism is able to get formulated as a comprehensive philosophical point of view, unlike problems of the generalization of new situations which take place after falling-apart structuralist ideas and streams. Of course (again) we have to mention neomarxism among primary motivators of postmodern meta-philosophy’s special knowledge-sociological strategy, as the neomarxism of 1968 (partly relying upon earlier Marxist tradition) practiced knowledge-sociological criticism over the present of citizenship from all directions; its ideology- on the basis of the sociology of knowledge – could be applied at all possible new objects and phenomena, and after all, it was the most efficient component of the actual vitality of the neomarxism of ‘68.

A defining attitude of everyday consciousness of the present labelled as postmodernism, relevant also from the aspect of utopical potential is an attitude metaphorically called “anti-totalitarism”, which originally meant a morally, intellectually and pragmatically clear separation from any kind of open or concealed totalitarist attitude of the century. But in the present, this attitude leads to rejection of long-term commitment, to avoiding alliances based upon values, and it has transformed a great deal in comparison with its original contents. Anti-totalitarism taken this way is in fact a ground of sustenance of postmodern individualism’s capacity, and it’s at the same time its explicit ideology. Anti-totalitarism taken this way is also obviously anti-utopistic; straightly and primarily intended, it keeps postmodern individual away from developing social groups, of which general or non-general interests it could associate with actualization of utopistic visions. Postmodernism likes to make (also) the attitude of its critics (even 100% scientist ones) seem wrong, “totalitarian”, autocratic, authoritarian, or at least paternalist. Well, this gesture is an excellent example for “anti-totalitarian” attitude of postmodern everyday consciousness we theoretically explicated above. This attitude is scientifically instrumentalized multiple times.

It seems, a 1970 speech of Michel Foucault, “The Order of Discourse” (“L’ordre du discours”; inauguration at Collége de France, 2^nd December 1970) contains a formulation of genealogical purity of most important indicated features of this postmodern attitude in question, with ideal-typical self-evidence. Of course, postmodernism didn’t yet come into question in 1970, so considering this, we need to modify our definition: to put it in style, Foucault’s speech shows the birth of postmodern intelligentsia from the spirit of the decline of neomarxism and structuralism in an ideal-typical way. And here we find further difficulties now of sociological nature, as sociologically, postmodern intelligentsia can be divided into two great parts: program-giving – power-possessing (in later phrasing: missionaire), and program-follower intelligentsia (in later phrasing: missioned), one following instructions of power. Well, this structural and functional duality of the postmodern image of humanity (of which historical equivalents we can find at all relations of intelligentsia and society, political ideologies and society following them, ideologist left-wing intelligentsia and labor class following it) became real-sociologically defining also for latter decades, as missioning and following a mission crashed intellectual and moral determinations of earlier intellectual attitudes with shattering self-evidence; as the definition of intellectual and moral principles gets to the missionaire center from now on; followers are free from any intellectual or moral decision, and they may feel free to do so inasmuch as missionaires convince them perfectly about the absolute intellectual and moral perfection of their own trend.

We must indicate three essential dimensions of the postmodern man, developing in connection of postmodern missioning, which are building upon one another, still they should be distinguished from each other. These are dimensions for which a characteristic of postmodern philosophical space applies, as a direct, moreover, apparently direct mixture of intellectual traditions, attitudes and structures – totally unknown before – appear in it, something totally new, in a way different from what cultural memory could consider new so far.

We have to focus on the proto-type of postmodern man, that can surely be identified with the basic attitude built upon philosophical considerations of postmodern opinion-makers. On the other hand, we have to apprehend and demonstrate the missioning process of postmodern people, i.e. people at the end of the millennium taken as target audience, developed under the systematic educatory-missionary influence of postmodern ideologists and their ideologies (which can be undiscernably similar to the basic attitude in a given situation – as mainstream tendencies show it totally evidently – that is, missioning, or from another side, accomodation of intellectual and non-intellectual strata to ideologies of missioning shall be considered exceptionally perfect). And finally, we must be aware of the aspect of a possibility of being detected by the typology of real, empirical sociology of the proto-type(s) developed in philosophical-historical field of force, and of the missioned variant(s). This latter aspect alone, of course doesn’t contain any especially postmodern dimension, as from the Réneissance to these days, the unity and simultaneous difference of proto-types and real-sociological dimensions made ideal-typical and developed through philosophical-historical motives is a qualified technical problem, for which treatment complicated intellectual apparates have been developed.

In the reconstruction of postmodern man, we rely on the above-mentioned text of Michel Foucault. Here does Foucault put the essential determinations of the postmodern man for the first time, by also giving the most important directions of a new system of axes we described above as the great transformation of the sixties and seventies, and what we could describe – by naming it – as the concurrent perish of structuralism and neomarxism, and a forced and shattering change in the orientation of intelligentsia (if we also united all chance-giving social aspects of welfare state that refer to this, we could also call it a new class) that had built its intellectual, social, and material existence upon these trends. The Foucault-speech itself is the text of a “real” speech held at an especially important occassion, so its directly calling style – in this direct manner of missioning surely unusual that time – could actualize for the first time in the form of real communication.

This text of Michel Foucault also carries uncomparable postmodern arbitraryness. Namely, if we see the missioning outlines of the type of postmodern man – put sharply as it is, we can find: most of all, partly other authors who were considered postmodern later, partly intense debates of postmodernism that can’t be bound to the name of  any particular outstanding representative, took part in forming and passing the image of the postmodern man of a subject-matter Foucault could put quite early with a demand of representativity, with exceptional sharpness. In other words: neither is this speech – a text we chose for the starting point of our analysis, as the best, the most sound text – of exclusive significance in Foucault’s activity, nor do we intend to ignore the fact that other authors and discussions had also taken part in developing this man image beside Foucault, at some philosophers even more efficiently. Yet we think, this speech meets even the most extreme expectations of representativity as it summarizes everything that is actually important for the actual man at the end of the millennium. In the elaboration of the postmodern man’s most important features, and in their obvious missioning, others had surely taken a greater part than Foucault, while the importance of Foucault’s activity on the whole doesn’t exhaust in an elaboration of the co-ordinates of the postmodern man’s existence, which is still valid today.

The man of Michel Foucault puts the world in the opposition of “desire”  and “institution”. This is one’s own life situation, but it’s a “condition humaine” for everyone else as well. In “desire”, Foucault’s conceptual shortcuts, contential and extensial problems of his concept-building – despite and all the softness and bluntness of these categories – give recognizable and identifyable concepts – we can find imprints of  freedom, self-fulfillment, individualization, libido, non-conformism, and all basic concepts and tendencies that can be bound to them. And “institution” centralizes definitions of society, state, power, and authority. Thus, in the opposition of desire and institution appears the opposition of self (not defined any closer) and authority (not defined any closer either), while – right because of a specific extension and softening (refinement?) of terms – concerning inner dimensions, both pole-terms in opposition are unelaborated and undifferentiated in multiple respects. It would require much more space to talk about the whole significance of this deformative-deconstructive modification of conceptal extension. This “reform” didn’t mean any problem for direct actors of that age, but it gave an opportunity for the missioning philosopher to create a new language in a new way, i.e. to draw himself out of discoursive rules concerning their writing. This softened concept-building therefore refers to phenomena of state, power, authority as objects, but without obviously carrying discoursive knowledge, research results, historical experience, or – and this might prove to be a most important feature of postmodern missioning – numerous “frozen” variants of meanings hiding “tacitly” in these concepts, still quite significant. This “reform” of conceptual extension gives a specific range to postmodern terminology. Its unelaborate and undifferentiated nature is well-articulated and easily understandable in its own way; it closes up concepts that can be contentially closed up, for a given audience of a given age (and right this given audience in this given age). These days, or in the near future, in this double and rival field of force, “the situation of mankind”, “desire”, “institution” shall lead to visions unfollowable with social concepts of a sound mind for audience that doesn’t acquire the conceptal culture of the sixties, but on the turn of the sixties and seventies, any reader who was taking part in intellectual discourse even to the smallest extent, could easily follow the elements of these general concepts, and their summing. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to imagine argumentation against the interpretation or possible practice of Foucault’s “institution” by say, the term “executive power” from the age of democratic division of power, or to put this “institution” as an outcome of various “contract”-theories or any other emancipation processes. The first result of “reformed” concept-building is not the polemical kind of contential opinion-making against existing opinions, included in the “institution”, but qualified discussion becoming impossible (how could e.g. the problem of modern welfare state be discussed on the same conceptual level with Foucault’s term of “institution”?). Another aspect of this was still standing in front of a great carreer in 1970, and that was the appearance of a new concept of politics. As not only does the difference in the concepts’ discoursivity deliberately make the concept of “institution” incommensurable with discoursive-scientific approaches of this concept, but the antagonism of “institution” and “desire” includes relevant incommeasurability as well; this antagonism is of a political content in a way that it can’t be interpreted by conventional terms of politics.

The two new poles of “desire” and “institution”, in which the most important measures of then discussion appear with a new way of concept-building and technique, are relevant and worth to be mentionedtwo more times, from two quite basic aspects of this inquiry. First, we would draw the attention to the way Foucault tries to elaborate by this unique way of concept-building (which could even be called simply a strategy, or a technique which realizes it, from certain given aspects) the conceptual demands of the nature disaster-like death of both neomarxism and structuralism (i.e. why the new concept-building technique is necessary in a certain sense, and why does it remind at the neomarxist and structuralistic ways of concept-building, which are to be considered disqualified). Second, again we would remind at an immanent problem of a method for softening the sharpness of earlier philosophical or right scientific terminology of this type, that its deconstructive and doubtlessly renewing effect can only prevail in contrast with the terminology directly precedent to it, i.e. they can achieve the originally expected legitimate effect in the consciousness of an audience, which had already possessed the previous terminology in its full as well, and in which actual consciousness conceptual reform, reconstruction, or revolution can actually take place. Deconstructive concept-building is totally exposed to hermeneutical arbitraryness, moreover, randomness, in all kinds of consciousness for which – simply from historical reasons –

 it’s not possible to actualize new opportunities rising from the confrontation of the original and the new conceptuality any more. For example, if we tried to apply the great dichotomy of “desire” and “institution” literally and entirely for say, today’s monetarist or neoliberal world (which Foucault couldn’t foresee of course, at the time that paper got published), the encounter of postmodern “desire” with say, the World Bank or IMF, as institutions, would make even those laugh, who don’t consider the present situation funny at all.

The new humanity-image of that time, the outlining of later postmodernism was successful and totally obvious not only for peers, but also for the rest of latter grades of progress. Foucault outlines (and also embodies) a kind of man, who in actual fact wouldn’t like to articulate himself; none of the components of his self-articulation points beyond itself. Its positive content is desire (as we have pictured, in its multiple ideal-typical generality). It catches the eye, how the new man presents himself as an undifferentiated complex (as “desire”), impossible for latter conceptual analyses to analitically differentiate or disintegrate it. Man is desire itself, he’s identical with desire; we may presume, every restriction of desire from the outside would be an unacceptable and totalitarian measure for the new mankind. Of course, in this concept of desire, some hints at former elements of emancipation can be recognized as well (when the satisfaction of desire at a widening range was still a part of the processes of liberation); of course, without us still being able to place desire equal to man along the axis of emancipation-repression in this concept.

From the aspect of institution(s), the outlines of the new life-situation of the new man contains a row of hints not less obvious. Not only is the new man fundamentally and basically against the “institution” (developed through ideal-typical content-related compressions), but he sees the most radical denial of his identity, of desire, and therefore his totalitarian antagonist in it right from the beginning. The basic state of desire and institution, in which they both exclude one another, is so strong that the articulation of the new man, the process of finding his discourse can only generate an exclusive opposition to the institution. The institution encourages him to articulate himself, but Foucault makes it clear, that a possible adoptation of the discourse of institution would totally kill desire and the whole new identity of the new man built on desire.

“Institution” encouraging the individual, “desire” to self-articulation, and “desire” rejecting the “institution’s” offer for discourse with fear of annihilation might seem like a new concept. But looking from the viewpoint of neomarxism, all this new conceptuality is nothing else but a re-formulation of the theoretical element of so-called “repressive tolerance” . Each element of the identity of the new man stands so close to neomarxism! The most general and most overall elements of this (and it’s also an evidence for us) are an ideal-typical concept of institution, where the specifically anti-neomarxist establishment attitude (which was a result of a complex ideal-typical formulation itself, even within the neomarxist context), and then, the almost untouched leading of this anti-establishment attitude to post-neomarxist philosophical space – which is an essential element of Foucault’s new man as well – becoming possible from objective reasons.

But exceeding these basic content-related definitions, the new man defined in the specifically charaterized mutual field of force of desire and institution is not completely defined in his basic gestures yet. To mention just a few conspicious examples: in principle, “desire” might attack “institution”, but it might also draw back within the circles of its inward; and institution might not only choose the attitude of “repressive tolerance”, perpetual manipulative allure to articulation suitable for he taste of the “establishment” towards “desire”. The first decisive basic gesture of the new man, an intellectual strategy and decision coming from the antagonism of “desire” and “institution”, is the fact that he’s missioning, and he’s being missioned. The announcers of the new man (while they give a concrete meaning to the basic relationship of “desire” and “institution”, chosen from numerous possible meanings) don’t outline their ideal just as a modest wish, but they intend to actively take part in its perpetual production and re-production through missioning. Moreover, they also put their decisive articulations as a program, which contains not only thoughts, but principles for action-orientiation, and in definitive basic situations, even guides including the direction of the right action; in other words, essential articulations do mission even by themselves. Of course, this missioning and missioned basic character of the new man can be brought in connection with neomarxism again (indirectly, even with structuralism, as a movement), although this connection also contains interesting differences. Within the neomarxist universe, theoretical contents and missioning – in a simplified way – was approximately parallel with the duality of “theory” and “practice” severing clearly, moreover, even manifesting in institutions. In case of the postmodern man, this clear detachment doesn’t work any more: there is no (theoretical) content without a missioning element, and there is no missioning activity without theoretical content.

Of course, we wouldn’t like to trace this attitude of Foucault’s new man – connected with double missioning – back to neomarxist origins in its full, as the attitude obviously goes back to several other components as well. Still, this is the point where the direction and content of this philosophical process can be shown with the accuracy of geology. In neomarxism, the measure of missioning could play a subordinated role, because the integration of this trend was accomplished by theoretical content, “ideology”, articulated in its explicated form, while “practice” was a consequence, which could be deduced almost automatically from this. The demolition of neomarxism – in the manner of a natural disaster – made this division of labor impossible, so a new relationship of theory and practice necessarily evolved in each postmodern complex (which meant right the relationship of missioning in its contents).

After all this, in the threefold of “desire”, “institution”, and (unspoken) “missioning” appears the “world” of the new man, more precisely, instead of the positive world of the new man, rules of attitude the new man must obey – in the spirit of missioning,  camouflaged as description. As these rules of attitude immanently aim at a total rejection of existing circumstances, keeping them evolves extraodrinary deconstructive potential in the ideal of the new man. Of course, the dichotomy of “desire” and “institution” becoming inward and making all kinds of intermediation impossible, inherits the demolishing criticism of neomarxism concerning both the unwithdrawn class struggle and the culture of the establishment (but again, we pronounce this in a way that we don’t consider neomarxism an only and mono-causal starting point at this point either). From behind a neomarxist originated rejection of reality, disappeared neomarxism (having suffered a critical blow). Thus we have found the origins of the ideal-typical transformation of terms, of which methodological problems we talked above.

The rules of the right attitude appear as a language game, as a description of reality, as a description, which in its unrefutable evidence, calls upon practicing the right attitude. At the reviews of the contents of “desire” and “institution”, we had to draw the attention to the fact that both of these new terms are unbelievably one-dimensional, and we considered this from the side of concept-building in our preface. Now, the concrete and sweeping deficiencies of this one-dimensional nature can also get to our view. Thus it’s also characteristic of the whole postmodernism that it totally lacks the emancipative measure from its total rejection towards “reality” and “society”. It’s already the third case, when we can discover the disappearance of neomarxism as a most important reason standing behind this (of course, without considering it the only reason). Total rejection lacking an emancipative (or utopistic) element is an extraordinarily specific situation in the history of philosophy, just like the articulation of “desire” lacking the great sublimation accomplishments of man, culture, and society, or an extremely rejecting one-dimensional view of establishment lacking a consideration of generic values (contract theory, division of power, enlightenment, etc.) that had been christallized in it. Here, we don’t have the opportunity to examine, to what extent is the sustenance of each essential generic-emancipative position, with an apparent lack of specific generic-emancipative contents, connected to separate, concrete problems of neomarxism (and structuralism). It’s surely connected to it, but the same way is it sure that this connection is not exclusive. Several neomarxist aspects possible at this moment of the birth of the postmodern man hint the fact that to some extent, postmodernism managed to perpetuate the role of the sense-giving monopoly of neomarxism, or of its hegemony of such contents.

From many directions, we’ve already been preparing the basic strategy of missioning, which classically appeared at an early stage at Foucault, and then settled in latter periods of postmodernism. This is based on a shorelessly expanded criticism of the sociology of knowledge, which accuses the “institution’s” politics of knowledge on the whole, from all possible aspects (we might point out: from five significant aspects) with such a smashing power, that the potential postmodern man (“desire”) must occupy a position of practical denial towards the “institution” from the beginning. Each element of this smashing criticism practised from five aspects, has become a detail of later elaborated postmodern philosophy, i.e. an emblematic issue of postmodern philosophy.

There’s nothing left for the postmodern man to choose, but to get completely missioned. This missioning also became an empirical, sociologically perceivable reality concerning the intelligentsia between the seventies and the nineties, and society in general as well. Therefore, it contains no critical exaggeration about the possible parallel between the postmodern man and the man at the end of the millennium. In the spirit of shorelessly expanded knowledge-sociological criticism, if the postmodern man is getting missioned correctly, he must recognize that (in a trivial sense) censorship, the duality of sanity and madness, and the difference between true and false are not simply non-legitimate differences, but they had been forced upon “desire” by the “institution”. According to the concepts, the postmodern man thus already stepped upon this most important new field of the five great critical aspects. But maybe he didn’t think it over, whether the basic deconstruction in question was legitimate or not, in a philosophical, social or moral sense. Postmodern missioning, which is equal to the missioning of the man at the end of the millennium, doesn’t announce new, positive contents, but it makes it impossible for him to accept even most general, most trivial, most tautological suggestions provided by the “institution”. Thus intelligentsia, and the group extending out from it in a sociological sense, shall become a giant sect, which is held together by all necessary props of regulation, while the “institution” controls the re-producing process of society on the whole, and – now we can say it openly – after all, it has transformed our world in a definite way, without (latter) postmodernism.

Michel Foucault grounds missioning of a new quality also from the aspect that a positive explanation of the contents and values, which determine new adaptation, is missing. Doubtlessly, the main reason of this was a volitional decision, as Foucault did absolutely consciously eliminate neomarxist terminology from the new program, of which missioning character is unmistakable. Moreover, looking back from the new millennium, we might recognize not only a new intellectual and moral pattern, but also new sociological modifications, and modifications of social attitude in this basic situation, moreover, modifications, which are being represented by several intellectual and social groups, while at the same time, they don’t know much about their basis and founder. We might identify all this in an intellectual (or other kind of) practice of adaptation, which doesn’t start along well-stated positive values, but it follows the traces of conceptual strategies of intimations and symbolical hints, chosen differently from the extensions of discoursivity. “Symbolical adaptation” – as we might call this new, carefully calculated social attitude generated by Foucault, designed as the optimal effect of missioning, in which – in a paradox way – and that’s where the new phenomenon lies – not the adaptation itself is symbolical, but goals, values, and contents, in which spirit the adaptation takes place. This also means a radical exchange compared to Marxism and neomarxism up to that time, as the group-constituting effects of the ideologies announced in them cannot yet be considered missioning in the new sense. “Symbolic” adaptation, or adaptation turning more and more into simulation, as a leading pattern of social attitude, follows from reformed concept-building modified in its extensions as well, with an interesting logic. As for them (as we have already mentioned), the antagonism of “institution” and “desire” is still apt to recall outlines of political, social and other kinds of antagonism; but for the next generations, the practice of simulation and symbolical hints is inescapable.

Michel Foucault’s complete missioning distinguishes five “systems of exclusion”, and missioning itself consists of nothing else but the act of making knowledge, social practice, cultural tradition (in a broader sense), the interpretation of writings, and other phenomena and mechanisms that can be considered problem-free be known and recognized as systems of exclusion. His missioning is therefore some kind of re-evaluation, of which “result” is the development of the expected sense, i.e. the ability to recognize social praxis (in a broader sense) as a five-fold system of exclusion, i.e. as repression behind the “appearance” (while systems of exclusion following each other like concentric circles expanding outwards from the center, contain several ideal-typical cases themselves).

Michel Foucault’s defining mean for interpreting social institutions and social practice as “exclusion” (and then making this interpretation generally accepted as the result of missioning) is the mean of sociology of knowledge, or ideology-criticism. Neither in this case can it diminish the originality of postmodern thinking, and its incomparability with characteristics of philosophy up to that time, if we emphasize the importance of the fact that here too, postmodernism pursues a defining feature of neomarxism, in its shoreless expansion. We might consider it as a historical and empirical fact that neomarxism (as a consequencs of several reasons, each quite serious) had also considered sociology of knowledge (or ideology-criticism) the main variant of its view. It had seen the most practised manner and field of its all-round critical activity in it. We would label this neomarxist sociology of knowledge, which – beside all of its moving – stayed within Karl Mannheim’s basic definition of this discipline, as the paradigm of existential boundedness. It’s right the paradigm of existential boundedness Michel Foucault gets over by grounding the interpretation of social practice and institutions as systems of “exclusion”. A school (or school system) can be brought in connection with the phenomenon and concept of repression. This method might have empirical proofs, which can be put across in an ideology-critical sense (also in a way that we confront these empirical elements with the image society had developed about this school, but also in a way that we confront them with the image the school had developed about itself); then, we might bring the ideology-critical result in connection with each partaker’s circumstances of existential boundedness. But Michel Foucault (this is not the author’s original concept; it’s just an example, meant to illustrate the method) considers school an “institution” as well, and thus an institution of exclusion. The difference between the method outlined above (ideology-critical confrontation, an examination of the element of existential boundedness) and Michel Foucault’s method is right an overstrain of the sociology of knowledge (or ideology-criticism), by which Foucault accomplishes the operation of transposing social practice into systems of exclusion. This method is an excessive, unprecedented overstrain of the sociology of knowledge, and ideology-criticism. First, it leaves the solid ports of the paradigm of existential boundedness, and thus it brings original arbitraryness into the method of the sociology of knowledge (and ideology-criticism). Second, intended or not, it eliminates the theoretical meaning and importance of the objective sphere from this aspect too: social practice interpreted exclusively and windowlessly as a system of exclusion, simply eliminates all aspects of  a given objective sphere that cannot be dissolved in the exclusivity of the system of exclusion. Third – closely connected to this – sociology of knowledge overstrained this way eliminates historical attitude as well (remaining at our example: no one would recognize reformation, enlightenment, neo-humanism, or other kinds of emancipation in school interpreted as a system of exclusion – and thus, “this is the end of history”). Fourth, such an overstrain of the sociology of knowledge (ideology-criticism) abuses the spontaneous non-conformist and anti-authoritarian attitude of the partakers of the discussion. Its sharp and absolutistic attack creates a situation in the discussion, in which “desire”, following its elemental sense of justice, should defend the “institution” itself, for some objective or historical reason. And this is not really plausible, even considering all known forms of publicity.

But does such a shoreless overstrain of the sociology of knowledge (or ideology-criticism) not contradict our thesis, as Foucault’s new missioning strategies aren’t built upon positively explicated contents, and therefore they create special, new, symbolic forms of adaptation? Well, circles of exclusion appear positively at Foucault in a respect that – using strictly the expanded concept-building mentioned at the beginning – social methods and phenomena, in which the missioned should recognize a hidden source of repression, can be recognized and identified in a positive way (and thus the elimination of the objective sphere and historical attitude can take place). But thus has the presence of positivity got to its end in this argumentation. Foucault doesn’t exceed the stage of identifyable denomination. His concept-building is likely to make the development of a discoursive situation impossible. To this adds the failure of a positive description of the phenomenon or process declared an individual mechanism of exclusion (and thus the cancellation of a discussion in connection with this, as the argumentative elements would inescapably appear in the positive description of the phenomenon that has to be declared the antagonist). According to all this, positive elements and contents of the “right” attitude are not named either – that is, the thesis of the constraint of symbolical adaptation hasn’t undergone any changes.

Of course, the conclusions of Michel Foucault’s speech of 1970 can’t be exhausted in full by marking and analyzing these most important parts. These conclusions and initiatives grounded defining realities of the last third of the 20^th century. Their influence far exceeded the circle of those who evolved this new way of thinking in a specific historical situation. A most original measure of the novelty (not in a positive sense) of this initiative is the fact that this starting point is positively metaphysical and critical about metaphysics at the same time. It’s critical about metaphysics in a way that it pronounces the end of all philosophy and knowledge up to that point (as Foucault presents the contradiction of true and false in this work, solely as a system of exclusion), and it proves it from many aspects, but all proving processes might as well be taken as criticism of metaphysics. But this trend is metaphysical in a sense that it draws its positive contents out of all possible criticism. It’s true that this measure, which we have only considered from the side of “symbolical adaptation” so far, leads to a specific and yet undescribed kind of metaphysics, as it doesn’t draw explicit positive contents, but non-explicated positive contents out of all examination or research. Still, metaphysics remains metaphysics. But a new philosophical re-start, which is metaphysics and criticism of metaphysics at the same time, is a new phenomenon which transforms, and which has actually transformed philosophical space already, from every essential aspect.

The situation of today’s philosophy is unique and novel from many aspects, in comparison with other eras of philosophical tradition. First, it might has never been as free as it is today: for in the past eras, it has always been one of academical and social activities, which had the most direct consequences. It was impossible to talk about philosophy that lacked any preliminary conditions or consequences so far. By the rising of the global era of neoliberalism in 1989, this situation seemed to come to an end. Of course, great and all-round expectations also appeared together with great freedom. But while these expectations are strongly present, at the same time, society doesn’t seem to expect from philosophy the fulfillment of all-round expectations that it has towards itself. Expectations of a completely different kind emerge. Yet the situation is paradox and “postmodern”; as great freedom or great expectations don’t possess any coercive power; neither freedom, nor expectations make philosophy a central activity for society.

But, while great freedom and great expectations don’t make philosophy a central activity, worldly metaphysics and pre-rational, pre-modern thinking live their renaissance. Not only ignorance, but even knowledge can lead to a re-formulation of the need for metaphysics, as a social or moral need.

The process of views becoming worldly, and thus the elimination of worldly metaphysics, is not being considered as emancipation, but as loss, as an experince of “all the whole things are broken”. Wordly metaphysics and its equivalents appear in philosophical debates in a great variety, moreover, in a way that there is often no explicit demand to define the term.

Another tendency (but in its results not really prosperous either) is the philosophy (sometimes science as well) is being depicted as an omnipotent trend that can solve anything. And if it’s so, it’s very simple to show that philosophy (and/or science) in fact doesn’t solve everyíthing. Old oracle: if we want to discredit something, we have to depict it as something omnipotent.

It’s another important tendency that – on the ground of some definitions and images – philosophy is being considered an empty space, which can be filled up with various contents anytime – it’s just a matter of good-will or creativity. Among many factors, the diversity of philosophy can also provide a ground for such ideas, i.e. the idea that neither philosophy, nor philosophical space is continual; that common features of different schools don’t make up a whole, but just an inordinate mass. But of course, philosophical space is anything but unfilled. Using an analogy with chess: of course each game has to be started over and over again, but this doesn’t mean the infinite number of chess games that has been played in the past, according to certain traditional rules, don’t fill out the “space” of chess. Mutatis mutandis, Kant’s principle of the possible experience is still valid for philosophy, inasmuch as philosophy is not omnipotent, and its goals are limited in a certain sense, which is different from the limitation of the goals of science.

Today, metaphysics (even in its form before Kant) appears as completeness, before we “lost” the actually broken whole. In this context, the great victories of criticism, emancipation or worldly thinking figures as the reason and trigger of a great loss of civilized life. In the meanwhile, the present doesn’t realize the adequate philosophical solution, which is bound right to Nietzsche in a concrete form that can still be actualized today, i.e. timely and adequate forms of worldly universalism have to be re-formulated on the emancipatory basis of the victory of criticism. This suggestion provides an alternative for a fast loss of philosophy’s validity, as a side-effect of actual freedom and actual plurality.

The last thirty years of philosophy gave two main trends of philosophical thinking an active role of effectively shaping history and society. One of them was the renaissance of the epistemological methodology and theory-building of neoliberalism-neopositivism, which effectively restored the continuity of the positivism of the former Vienna Circle, as well as it expressed the new, anti-communist, neoliberal concept on the field of politics, economy, and philosophical methodology of those, who had been disappointed by Marxism in the thirties already. When the New-Left unexpectedly declined in the seventies, this trend gained a global and strategically decisive role. The other trend, which effectively shaped history and society, was the complexity of the postmodernist way of thinking, which also gained a global and strategically decisive position in the seventies, after the sudden and simultaneous fall of neomarxism and structuralism. In spite of the fact that the last thirty years passed under the dual and simultaneous hegemony of neopositivism and neoliberalism, the two trends have very rarely made open contact with each other. However, significant symmetry-relations can be pointed out between the two trends of the era.

Because of its decisive and constituting significance in human thinking and concept-building still mostly unrevealed today, there can be built a new sociology of knowledge upon the symmetry-phenomenon. If we take the society of knowledge in the broader sense, as an explanation of the sociological-historical basis of all-time, mainly philosophical knowledge, symmetry may occupy a significant position in the row of possible causalities. And if we add that specifically knowledge-sociological explanation of knowledge in its concrete form doesn’t take objective or disciplinary measures – which lead to individual statements – as a basis, but “further” definitions and motives, which don’t directly belong to these objective or disciplinary frames, but exceed them (that’s why it was obvious in the twenties and thirties that this meta-science of philosophy and  in general can be nothing else but “sociology”), it’s obvious: symmetry has great chances to acquire a significant role, maybe even the chance of evolving an independent paradigm of knowledge-society, in the broad sense of the society of knowledge. One striking reason of these chances is the extraordinary distance between symmetry and paradigms or existing disciplines, which is right adequate for the expectations. Another outstanding component of the knowledge-sociological chances of symmetry is the fact that a society of knowledge (or a less general discipline of a knowledge-sociological kind) built upon it might mean a new starting point, which would be different from the basic starting point which had been the most defining one so far – and that was the starting point of existential boundedness. Numerous elements of the sociology of knowledge (including some really decisive measures) have already been explicitly formulated in histories of previous philosophies. Leaving possible considerable elements of antique philosophy totally disregarded, the society of knowledge could take an outstanding position in the first great concepts of modern philosophy already (mainly at Bacon), as a discipline of the criticism of epistemology, mainly of false acquaintance.

According to preliminary consideration, the society of knowledge built upon symmetry could be evolved by uniting three reasonable issues (each complete and reasonable on its own):

1)      criticism of the concept of symmetry, as an idol which influentially guides thinking and philosophy;

2)      positive research of the actual genealogy of the concept and symmetry-phenomenon, or a positive outline of a trace of this actual genealogy;

3)      analysis of “justified”, “legitimate” cases of symmetry, and drawing their specific consequences which are related to the sociology of knowledge.

Concerning symmetry as a really decisive component of philosophy, the most general connection that can be made, is an idea of symmetry as antropomorphization, sufficiently defined from the view of the society of knowledge. Thus, most of the time, a recurrent characteristic of  – maybe strongly different – philosophical concepts is that a symmetric position of conceptional contents, terms, measures, or values, brings about further un-recognized and non-reflected contential-conceptional definitions building up. Thus we may feel free to state that symmetry, in this indirect, even if not completely conscious, still in a specifically knowledge-sociological sense self-sufficient way, develops into a self-sufficient theory-building factor, and the direction and basic tendency of its theory-building is by all means antropomorphic. Although antropomorphization is basically of an epistemological character, and thus in its effects it’s a scientific phenomenon, its validation for the whole of philosophy, or science in general is by no means illegitimate, as the phenomenon itself possesses a reasonable opportunity of application at each discipline in question. The symmetry-phenomenon in its generality, can be considered antropomorphic, because the actualization of possible symmetry-relations which emerge along intellectual activity, takes place in an antropomorphic way most of the time. In other words, actualizing symmetry-relations put an end to the actual epistemological process, and they actualize in a (mainly formal) frame, to which they become the new frame of further epistemological examination.

The symmetry-phenomenon appearing on the fields of thinking (science and philosophy) mostly as “antropomorphization” becomes an all-time “humanization” of epistemology also because it emphatically appears in the sphere of everyday consciousness too, as a measure which contains such tendencies. For everyday consciousness namely – in which sphere the phenomenon of antropomorphization can be considered legitimate, moreover adequate – is a basis for scientific knowledge from many aspects, and symmetry is an organic part of it. The basic principles of the operation of everyday consciousness (with a more scientificexpression: of the specific manner everyday consciousness processes reality) are multiply interwoven with symmetry. We would mention just one basic principle, “spontaneous materialism”, by which everyday consciousness takes concrete and perceivable reality as it is (for example, instead of spiritual or metaphysical contents anticipated by many), and as far as this given concrete reality is organized according to the principles of symmetry, it shall accept symmetry (together with other similar contents) as real, within a possible and legitimately antropomorphic point of view. This same attitude is being strenghtened by another decisive principle of the functionality of everyday consciousness, and its way of processing reality, that is so-called “spontaneous harmonisticism”. This principle grasps another prominent attitude of everyday consciousness: everyday consciousness can though estimate the dynamic and conflictual nature of reality in its total weightyness, yet it can’t get on without a comprehensive assumption of harmonisticism, of universalism in any cultural segment. Well, the decisive role of “spontaneous harmonisticism” in the functioning of everyday consciousness, means the total acceptance of symmetry, without which it would be impossible to imagine any kind of harmonisticism.

But the general functioning of everyday consciousness has one more feature which inseparably binds it to symmetry right in its generality, i.e. even regardless of concrete principles, or exceeding them. This comprehensive phenomenon, without which the function of everyday consciousness for processing reality, would practically become so impossible that we couldn’t even get to putting concrete principles, is analogy. As thinking in analogies means short-cut, direct, unreflected acceptance of certain existing contents, structures, and terms (while the lack of reflection is one defining criterion of everyday consciousnes), the original symmetry-relations of contents accepted by analogies may get among the new contents of everyday consciousness without undergoing any changes.

A comparison between the genealogy of symmetry and the genealogy of (political) power might mean a defining new component, or even a new field of research, of the critical sociology of knowledge of symmetry thus declared obviously antropomorphizing in general (concerning non-a prioristic, non-deductive philosophies). In this segment, the symmetry-phenomenon is one possible main component of the structure and basis of knowledge. Philosophical sociology of knowledge also took relevant hints at the relationship between basic categories of human knowledge, and political power, from the early modern age already. As it was possible to interpret this relationship in many ways, and it contained several concrete ideas, we can’t undertake a detailed description of each variant now. For example, a giant ancient problem of the sociology of knowledge is embodied by the literature of polemical essays of humanism and protestantism; one great knowledge-sociological criticism of its sort was embodied by the theoratical and practical movements of enlightenment; neo-Hegelianism, which was practically based on the sociology of knowledge, brought a renaissance of this theoretical trend, and by the time the knowledge-sociological element became an organic part of “Marxism” – which had become a paradigm a great deal independent from Marx already – “new enlightenment”, the Nietzschean paradigm of the sociology of knowledge had already acquired great international popularity with its “revaluation of all values”. These giant trends (and the row of their renaissances, following each other in a certain rythm) have all chategorized the specifically genealogical relationship between basic structures of knowledge (with a postmodern expression: “the order of things”) and political power. Of course, this also means, if the symmetry-phenomenon is a part of given figures of knowledge in any form, it naturally gets in connection with political power, as it is the possible starting point of the constitution and distribution of society’s knowledge. But from the point of the sociology of knowledge, it was possible to summarize all these great aspirations of the sociology of knowledge in the paradigm of Karl Mannheim’s existential boundedness. This meant that within this paradigm, the constitution and distribution of basic categories of knowledge (thus the symmetry-phenomenon, too) through political power was only possible by an assumption of existential boundedness (embodied by interests). But, according to its definitions, the paradigm based upon existential boundedness didn’t play such an important role in defining and constituting the bases of knowledge, but in the fact that the phenomenon of “ideology-suspicion” , which had been used in philosophical (political) discourse, got into the foreground. This meant, the criticism of the sociology of knowledge found its specifically knowledge-sociological task on the basis of existential boundedness not so much in constituting figures of knowledge, but in the research of ‘suspicion of ideology’, which had been used as a weapon in actual philosophical-ideological debates. This had a natural consequence for the symmetry-phenomenon, as it couldn’t play any important role in the sociology of knowledge based upon existential boundedness for this reason (not forgetting about the fact that the symmetry-phenomenon alone stands quite far from any possible interpretation of existential boundedness).

From all this follows, that the importance of the symmetry-phenomenon from the aspect of the sociology of knowledge, in a given situation a sociology of knowledge built upon the symmetry-phenomenon, or – and this possibility is also relevant and plausible – the sociology of knowledge of the symmetry-phenomenon itself, must play a subordinate role within the paradigm of existential boundedness, by all means.

But if we want to leave the paradigm of existential boundedness, we have two ways to choose from: first,we might deal in general with the problem of building up a sociology of knowledge which deals with the symmetry-phenomenon; second, we can make an attempt for estimating the position and role of the symmetry-phenomenon within the very scarce number of sociologies of knowledge with a non-existentially-bounded starting point.

Taking the second opportunity first: concerning trends of the society of knowledge, which don’t start from existential boundedness, we must mention the quasi-knowledge-sociological dymension of postmodern thinking, in which it would make sense to raise a knowledge-sociological approach of symmetry. For postmodernism radically expanded the circle of knowledge-sociological thinking, or – which means the same – the circle of knowledge-sociological criticism, and thus it stepped outside the paradigm of existential boundedness, into a totally new intellectual space. While the limit of knowledge-sociological criticism used to be the criterion for the existential boundedness of familiar- or different thinking, and thus – as a “suspicion” for this – it aspired to search for hidden motives, interests and goals of familiar- or different thinking, postmodernism took all kinds of thinking up to that point, or even the whole of human thinking into suspicion of ideology. It’s obvious that the whole of human thinking (no matter which one of its holistic segments may appear in the holistic target-circle of any given postmodern criticism) can’t be a consequence of existential boundedness (no matter how broadly it’s meant), so here, the whole of human thinking – exaggerated to holism – becomes an object for a sociology of knowledge expanded really to the extent. It’s quite neutral for our topical reasoning, with which one of the leading representatives’ concepts of this excessively expanded sociology of knowledge we may make this new intellectual opportunity more concrete. But there inevitably opens a way into the direction of symmetry’s sociology of knowledge, as knowledge taken under holistically knowledge-sociological criticism, by putting all formal measures and contents of knowledge under this criticism, can by all means make an attempt for criticism of the symmetry-phenomenon outlined above.

One variant of “postmodern” sociology of knowledge outlined above only in general (which can be shown only in a literally shoreless expansion of the discipline based on existential boundedness) seems especially apt for us to get into connection with a new sociology of knowledge of symmetry. This is Michel Foucault’s archeology of knowledge, which concipates(?) “the order of things”, the regulation of thinking, formal logic, and language in a giant genealogical taxonomy, and, as it is about philosophical sciences, it’s of a positive importance that he also wants to justify these pesumptions in a positive-empirical way in this historical-sociological summary, which is arranged by specific criteria, many of which can even be considered empirical. The essence of Michel Foucault’s concept is that it was (political) power itself, that constituted and fixed what we call knowledge. In the meanwhile, he doesn’t underline individual contents of knowledge, nor individual sciences, but the most general elements of all knowledge, like formal logic or the law of identity. Thus, in a short, thesis-like form, with a postmodern (not called that at the beginning, but “post-structuralistic”) knowledge-sociological homogenization, which totally absorbs fields which used to be absoultely excluded from the suspicion for ideology, he relativizes and de-legitimates the whole of knowledge (and contents relying upon it, each sort of knowledge, including science and philosophy). From the point of symmetry, it’s of a great importance, that it can be sorted among fields, for which even existing empirical or historical research could justify that they were actually (at least partially) products one of political power’s non-trivially or indirectly functioning forms of existence.

As the symmetry-phenomenon (not mentioning other aspects of its development and qualities) is very close to the spheres of  “ideology” and “political power”, in their clear forms. The order of the world, the harmony of interests, the structure of society, are all ideas which were meant to put the all-defining order of relations. This basic order of society, which constitutes society (even without any special analysis, this concept of order separates from different, still relevant concepts of order on several levels and structural positions of social existence and reproduction) is still being kept in basic terms like “Ordnungsmacht”, which are totally impossible to imagine without basic symbolical forms of order, like the symmetry-phenomenon. So, at this point, Foucault’s genealogy of knowledge is being fully justified, which in principle considers basic forms of knowledge absolutely “creatures” of political power. Moreover, further important criteria of these definitions also match symmetry, as not only the interest of the paradigm of existential boundedness can be shown here, but a hypothesis of Foucault’s concept of interest, the hypothesis of political repression always – even if unspoken – included into the constitution of knowledge, gains justification as well. As it’s surely not the actual system of society’s relations of power, what is projected in the form of symmetry. Up and down make up flawless conceptual symmetry, still nobody can be serious by saying that conceptual symmetry or any other kind of symmetry-relation can be true for the referential contents of concepts.  For in traditional societies through history, the term up always covered a group much lesser in number than the term down, and actual balance of forces between these two elements can be described by any means but by the means of symmetry. So, according to Foucault’s archeology of knowledge, symmetry could be one of the most important positive fields of new variants of the sociology of knowledge not based on existential-boundedness.

When stating this close connection of Foucault’s concept of knowledge, and the symmetry-phenomenon, we have to indicate, which parts of these paradigm – quite significant, moreover, apparently novel among today’s philosophical trends – we don’t agree with. The central position of “political power”, deprived from all concrete historical and sociological features, hints at the (by no means exclusive) new-left origin of Foucault’s theory quite apparently. In a paradox way, this abrupt new-left origin – kept unarticulated from weighty historical reasons – means for Foucault advantages and disadvantages as well. As an advantage, we might mention the separation from the concept of political power all-time concrete in new-left thinking, i.e. the elaboration of a new concept for this kind of power, which in its generality, can be considered a knowledge-constituting force as well. But the disadvantage of this concept is right what we have depicted as an advantage; as this concept of politics moves on such a non-speculative range of generalizations that it’s practically impossible to conceptually analyze it further, beyond stating its mere existence. Political power can be pointed out though, as the final determiner of the bases of knowledge, and therefore as the genuine source of the genealogy of the all-time figure of knowledge, but neither the genealogical process on the whole, nor its relevant parts can be made objects to theoretical or philosophycal discourse. Therefore, it’s not false to put political power in a genealogical position, but no obvious and intended theoretical justification process, but only a strong  feeling of evidence can lead to this, which might come from previous inquiry. Of course, it makes things more complicated that right because of the nature of power, political power doesn’t let publicity – that could be the empirical basis of previous or future inquiry – partake its decisive acts (and the definition and confirmation of bases of knowledge is of that kind). It’s interesting, that the legitimation of its designation as a final explanation – right because of its theoretical distance and inaccessibility – creates a situation almost isomorphic with the absolute expansion of the paradigm of existential boundedness, what is typical of postmodernism. After all, this expansion could be acceptable (as even formal logic can be expanded this radically), but it’s right its absolute nature what abolishes the real territory of theoretical or philosophical inquiry (and thus its object as well). As political power can be accepted as the real genealogical determiner of the bases of knowledge, formal logic can be relativized as well, as something that has no valid theoretical basis (and therefore its comprehensive use must be searched for in the depts of history). But we don’t gain anything for real inquiry in this case, as well as in the other one. First, we would keep on using formal logic in the future, so our criticism is “pointless”. Second, such a holistic doubt or relativization, beside leaving the totally “relativized” measure untouched in the way described above, doesn’t distinguish objective spheres that could be separated for criticism (every basis of knowledge had been created by political power, so every use of formal logic is wrong), so it can’t create the objectivity relevant within the frames of the sociology of knowledge, nor the possibility of conflicts (articulating themselves in a given frame of the sociology of knowledge), which is but the source of the eternal vitality of the paradigm of existential boundedness.

The philosophical criticism of the symmetry-phenomenon (which can still make up an organic part of a sociology of knowledge built upon symmetry) must rely on the analysis of conceptual symmetry-phenomena. The analysis of conceptual symmetry-phenomena (first of all, in each philosophical system and concept, but also in the principal-theoretical grounding of each science, in expanding concentric circles) shows it convincingly, that both basic and derived types (e.g. “reflectional” concepts, exceptionally cultivated by Hegel) of conceptual symmetries imply real circumstances which make merely conceptual symmetry-phenomena appear “real”. According to this fact, the order of language and the order of logic reach into the constitution of reality implied by a conceptual system, mostly in a general and comprehensive manner, independent from many qualified differences of individual philosophical systems. Despite this apparent connection, the research of conceptual symmetry has not yet become an organic part of philosophy. Therefore it’s not a mere coincidence, that critical research of conceptual symmetry – even if just in its initial form – comes from other sciences. Thus Reinhart Koselleck makes a significant effort for the science-philosophical examination of conceptual symmetry and asymmetry in his work ‘The historical-political semantics of asymmetric counter concepts’, because of a devaluation of some basic pairs of concepts that had taken part in the near past mostly in the science of history, and have still remained relevant for research. Koselleck’s asymmetric counter concepts (e.g. civilization and barbarism), develop through conceptual symmetry. For the examples Koselleck brings are all classical pairs of conceptual symmetry at the beginning (the pair civilization-barbarism is symmetric, as the whole of this pair fills out the whole extension of the concept of humanity, and thus in many contexts, even semantic attributes of symmetry might appear in the use of this pair). But symmetry – as Koselleck implies – becomes asymmetric in political or social practice (as one half of the pair concentrates all positive contents and values in itself, while the other one – in an apparent way not describable by semantic finery – becomes the universal negative pole, the universal enemy-image). Therefore, asymmetric counter concepts do not only develop from the symmetry-relation, but they are inseparable parts of the symmetry-phenomenon, and of its knowledge-sociological criticism. 

Therefore, the criticism of conceptual symmetry must include several subordinated issues which can hardly be detected in the beginning. First, it has to deal with the problem of independent and pure form symmetry-phenomena, which is about the collective total fill-out of a given concrete issue and the development of symmetrically distributed connections following from such a total fill-out of the given conceptual universe. A separate problem (but in our opinion, it’s also part of the issue of conceptual symmetry) is the problem of symmetry-relations becoming asymmetrical counter concepts, which have to be examined by this new genre of research; as here, research doesn’t only have to show the fact that “pure” conceptual symmetry fakes reality, for there are no actual symmetry-relations behind conceptual symmetry, but it also has the task of showing the deterioration of the content of asymmetrical counter concepts, the history and the reasons of false concept-building, with concrete and content-related arguments. Most of the time, the analysis of asymmetrical counter concepts can show that originally symmetric (and in their “purely” symmetric state quite problematic from the aspect of the sociology of knowledge) concepts become asymmetric a great deal for existentially bound reasons. A well-known example for this is the fact that going to the East, every country and society considers the East half of its capital the gate of the Balkan. In case of this pair of asymmetric counter concepts (put in a way not really typical of the desantropomorphic heights of scientific spirit) it’s clear that all the people consider themselves (in the sense of existential boundedness) civilized, not barbarian, independent from the fact that from the point of the people at the next border, they are the barbarians (again, for the reasons of existential boundedness). All this also means that at this point, symmetry’s sociology of knowledge meets the paradigm of existential boundedness again – and the consequences of this for the paradigm of existential boundedness are especially worth attention.

And finally, we shall point out some direct (or at least not as indirect as asymmetric counter concepts) – symmetric or asymmetric – counter concepts of existential boundedness, which are constantly being born in literature, politics or in the processes of social life. A poet (one of the greatest examples for this is a universal poet of European romanticism, Sándor Petőfi) might begin most of his poems with an explicit definition of “himself” and “the world” as total and existentially totally bound asymmetrical counter concepts. A politician might define himself or his trend as an asymmetric counter concept, on the basis of existential boundedness (“we are barbarians”).

The first component of a possible contemporary constructive meta-philosophy might be obvious now. We can be so critical and relativistic that we elaborate huge amounts of differences, but despite all of our scepticism and criticism, we still don’t need to take the basis of difference-logic. The second component of this possibility is the fact that we aren’t forced to declare ourselves “the end of philosophy”, the representatives of the last legitimate way of thinking, as there’s nothing that would objectively justify this thought. The third component of a constructive meta-philosophy is that we don’t need to ordain any right philosophical system of categories. We might apprehend philosophical, or even esthetical or political “oeuvres” into the greatest depths, still we can acknowledge the chance of methodological freedom to everyone, even if it exceeds the boundaries of anarchy. It could be the fourth component of the new variant that we don’t need to instrumentalize the suspicion of metaphysics for anyone. For the metaphysics-concept appearing in the spirit of “another world”, defines philosophies itself, even without any suspicion, so there’s no need to maintain a systematical position for instrumentalized and exclusive suspicions in philosophy. As the fifth component of the development, we suggest that we should find our position in each intellectual and social group according to a chosen philosophical point of view. Choosing the opposite way, i.e. the “right” choice of the group to identify with, leads to the right philosophical point of view, and thus to the right consciousness – well, this approach is still totally unacceptable for us. The sixth component of the new meta-philosophy may be the rejection of the possibility that our philosophy would become an institution and build out imperially. The belief that such an institution could only be an obstacle to finding the truth, and the other belief that any form of power is sure to set back the search for truth, both provide us a weighty reason to do so.

“Similarities” (also in general, but especially literally), “symmetry-relations” between philosophical trends which are related with each other neither in their contents, nor in a dialogic or critical way, often occur along the history of philosophy. So alone the appearance of the symmetry-relations of neoliberalism-neopositivism and postmodernism doesn’t count as a unique attempt. This attempt can be (and actually it is) made unique by three further measures. First, both neoliberalism-neopositivism and postmodernism are extremely multiple trends of a complex-nature, articulated in a very sophisticated way inside[1], i.e. both inside and outside interpretation and language might be right to interpret their terms as totally diverse contents. Consider the long way – from many aspects, it’s loaded with random components – the contemporary term of postmodernism has evolved. But another, not less illustrative example is the fact that the close connection of the three great components of the neoliberalism-neopositivism-postmodernism complex (epistemology-philosophy of science, political philosophy on the ground of human rights, philosophy of economy) has still not become totally decipherable for intellectually relevant, broader social groups, and this had weighty world-historical consequences. During the great political alteration in 1989, societies of the post-socialistic transition got into the action-radium of the organization of  neoliberal(-neopositivist) economy by the change to neoliberal(-neopositivist) politics. Of course, in such circumstances, we should be more accurate with the contents to ground the definition of these two giant and extremely complicated complexes with. On the neoliberal-neopositivist complex, we mean the philosophically anti-Marxist variant of the epistemological neopositivism of the twenties and thirties, which was reborn in the sixties, from which grew an individual- and democracy-centered, anti-communist political philosophy, and a philosophy of economy which relied on classical liberal politics of economy, but which declared totalitarian all the kinds of state intervention that had occured in it.

By the complex of postmodernism, we mean the trend approved by Jean-Francois Lyotard, which redefined those efforts, so far, regarded as post-structuralism, through the fundamental definition of the end of all metanarratives.[2]

Our attempt aims at showing possible symmetry-relations of the two great complexes in its effects on the whole of contemporary philosophy. Of course, here too, we are aware of the difficulties, or even the dangers of categorization and grouping, as “contemporary philosophy” – because of the actual empirical multitude – can only be reconstructed roughly, even if the outlines of central tendencies appear sharply. And finally, we apply the opportunities of contemporary philosophy, which outline from the symmetry-relations of neoliberalism-neopositivism and postmodernism, to the exceptional historical date of the turn of the millennium, and thus also to fields outside philosophy.

While analyzing the symmetry-relations of these two huge and extremely sophisticated complexes, it is advisable to begin by exploring the nature of complex characteristic itself. The two trends are of a complex nature in respect to their basic philosophical statements and relevant disciplines, as well as in respect to their political and science-political aspects. This symmetrical, complex nature covers likewise symmetrically opposing further structures. Neoliberalism-neopositivism became not simply established, but it also became internationally accepted as the declared and approved basis of the global system of actual institutions. Therefore, not only the relevance of the institutional nature[3] of neoliberalism can be pointed out, but also that this nature is overall, and moreover, that it still has a dynamically influencing character[4]. The accepted world economy and well-bred international politics obviously have a neoliberal-neopositivist basis, and the overall character of this foundation means a decisive shift from existing socialism and even from the development of the Western World after 1945[5]. Though only on a metaphorical level, neoliberalism-neopositivism, as a complex, still has an established nature nowadays, and as such, it is already expansive and continues to expand[6]. Within the symmetry, the complex nature of postmodernism is symmetrically opposing. Postmodernism is a virtual institution, which – in our point of view – absolutely does not modify the decisive fact of the above mentioned complex characteristic. Verifying this concept, not only numerous elements of the social existence of philosophy, literature, art, and architecture could be mentioned[7] but main aspects of postmodern philosophy and (philosophical) attitude must be recalled as well. The most important proof of the virtual institution is the determined effort of postmodernist thinking to take away the freedom of possible emerging meta-languages of its own (namely of postmodern philosophy contrary to all possible opinions about philosophy. Institutionalizing virtually (which has a concrete reality in representing postmodern as a complex) has another, not less significant symptom, namely the phenomenon of the particularly postmodern missionary efforts, which could be interpreted only in the context of the intention to create a specifically virtual institution and virtual social formation[8]. In this context, it must not be disregarded that postmodernism itself could successfully accomplish still existing, but incomplete integrations of post-structuralism as well. The complex-nature of postmodernism is in a great part due to this integrating character.

The two huge philosophical complexes are also symmetrical in a way that they are organically built upon two decisive trends of European politics and thinking. Neoliberalism-neopositivism became the philosophy of European conservative political trends, and, on this basis, the new neoliberalism interwined qualified and ideological conservative trends , as well as, qualified and ideological neoliberal philosophical, economical and political trends[9]. The post-left orientation of the postmodern trend remained secret for long not only for the common observer; even the postmodern characters themselves did not articulate this fact for a long time[10]. At this point, the relations between postmodernism and neoliberalism-neopositivism are not symmetrical in just one singular way. These relations are symmetrical because they are interwoven with late, if not “post” variants of decisive political trends, and also because the great political trends, themselves, originally had symmetric relations.

The two great philosophical complexes have never before come into notable political or intellectual contact with each other[11]. Therefore, our attempt should be one of the earliest, which directly correlates the two great philosophical complexes. Their political relations remain indirect and non-explicit. However, the indirect contrast of their philosophical efforts interlaces the history of the decades in question. At this point, we must not forget the so-called hidden work of symmetry-raletions. The contrasting motifs of the philosophically opposing complexes have similar effects as well, and what is more, this tendency is becoming more intense with time. To all this, the whole of our paper shall give several concrete examples.

Propagating the end of philosophy is contrary symmetrical, and at the same time, positionally the same overall message of both philosophical-political complexes. None of the great complexes directly preach the end of philosophy, but they are following it partly in their epistemology and interpretation of sciences, partly in their construction of theories, and partly in their logic of the right statements. Ideal-typical neoliberalism-neopositivism puts an end to philosophy, first of all, through the means of the physicalist logic of science. Postmodernism declares a new kind of impossibility of both (scientific) conceptualization and (philosophical) sense-giving through two leading concepts (Derrida and Foucault), here these channels represent the idea of an end of philosophy. Several details of this issue will be elaborated in other parts of this paper, and of course, many important details couldn’t get into it.[12] Furthermore, it seems that the propagation of the end of philosophy must be taken in serious consideration not only as a new thesis, but also as a thesis put in a new way. The fact that postmodernism puts an end to philosophy in a new way, with new strategies, and in a way which makes all re-start impossible, can be a common experience of those who have read postmodern writings without making an effort to rationally arrange them. It’s less obvious, but ending philosophy in a new way refers for approaches of neoliberalism-neopositivism as well. This could be explained by the huge disproportion between the reductive concept-building of ideal-typical neopositivism, and the multitude of possible philosophical positions[13].

The symmetry of the reforms of categorization (Begriffsbildung) is based on common intention with different content, namely that both complexes attempt to reorder the whole process of thinking through the re-regulation of the categorization itself. The two great philosophical complexes articulate the concept of ‘proper’ thinking, which is absolute, and marginalizes, in fact, criminalizes all other possible concepts for concept-building. The contrasting contents of symmetrically common basic intentions appear as symmetrical oppotites. The strategy of concept-building by the complexity of neopositivism-neoliberalism follows a “narrow”, “reductive” course, while the strategy of postmodernism follows an “extensive”, “enlarged” one, of which symmetric relations and the constitutive nature is again evident[14].

Instrumentalizing the sociology of knowledge (Wissensoziologie) is in the case of postmodernism an ideal type of concept-building and of constitution of the subject. In his presentation in 1970, Michel Foucault caught the essence of the whole discourse in the dichotomy of “desire” and “institution”, when he applied the above mentioned technique. It is not merely absolutely legitimate, but it is also very important for us in other respects. Integrating state, society, authority, linguistic games, values, traditions, power, repression under the term institution, and libido, self-fulfillment, creativity, individuality, and sexuality under the term desire has relevance in the neomarxist context[15] as well. This is, in itself, a realization of a clear-cut sociology of knowledge (Wissenssoziologie). The postmodernist extension of this method starts when the resulting concept of the legitimate sociological reconstruction of knowledge is interpreted as the initial, basic substratum of a new reality (Objektivität). This means, “desire” and “institution” are getting to be used as directly established objects in the field ofconcept-building. This process justifies the existence of the postmodernist concept-building based on the extension of the sociological interpretation of knowledge (Wissenssoziologie). We can’t be familiar with all essential consequences of this strategy of concept-building/constitution of subject. The most important thing is, we have justified the existence of the postmodern concept-building relying on the extension of the method of the sociology of science, we have presented its most important method (so we can examine it in its symmetry-relation with the neoliberal-neomarxist strategy of concept-building afterwards). Nevertheless, we must not forget about the perspectivity of this concept-building, which changes in time (for the intellectual actors of a given era, it doesn’t matter if postmodern wants to call the conceptuality and objectivity of state, society, power, authority “institution”; but this is not the case about latter generations, for whom the component of state, society, power, or authority might not be recognizable). But the perspectivity can change not only from the point of the individual (after all it’s not the same, whether an individual (as “desire”) is against a repressive, re-distributive state (as  “institution”), or with the World Bank, as a new and defining “institution”, for a confrontation with the latter one would be quite futile, even if one had a reason to do so). The extended version of the concept-building/constitution of subject of the sociology of knowledge raises even more serious problems from the viewpoint of social practice, including politics of course. For the reformation of concept-building in such a way leads to radical changes in social practice. One cannot make legal or other claims against an “institution” (as against a result of a philosophical abstraction and not a real organization). One cannot expect from it to keep the promises of the concrete welfare state. The opponency of the power of an “institution” – being too general – makes it impossible to criticize ist concrete measures[16].

This type of postmodern concept-building shows the coherence clearly enough, and this coherence is a decisive element of the complex of neopositivism-neoliberalism as well. According to this coherence, the proper philosophical attitude at first must be associated with political attitude, which was found proper previously to a certain extent. In the great complexes, seemingly not the proper philosophical attitude leads to proper political attitude, but the proper political attitude results proper philosophical attitude. This is, in fact, not a scientific or philosophical approach, but an ideological attitude.

The neopositivistic (the part of the neoliberal complex, of course) strategy of concept-building/constitution of subject is the opposite of the extension based on the sociology of knowledge, and furthermore, it’s in a symmetry-relation with it. The reverse of the extension of the sociology of knowledge (Wissenssoziologie) is the neopositivistic concept-building, which – despite all deviations and seeming differences – follows the basically physicalist mentality of the Vienna Circle. An obvious example of this method is the showdown of Karl R. Popper’s Open Society with the whole history of philosophy. In this book, which is devoted to the criticism of historicism, Popper reviews Karl Mannheim’s Man and Society in the Age of Reconstruction, which was originally published in Germany, in 1934, when the author was still in Dutch emigration. It was finally published after a second German edition in English as well, in Great Britain in 1941. Popper criticizes this book as “the most elaborated presentation” of social planning ‘which (he) I know(s)’[17]: We have to take here as an empirical fact that many people took Mannheim to be a communist only on the basis of this Popper criticism (which is the more remarkable, since Mannheim’s book closes ideologies, it’s technocratic, therefore it is obviously an anti-communist work). This was probably the first time that Popper assumed the attitude he had been practising since the seventies with increasing success, namely turning anti-communist things into communist things. This measure refers to everyone who doesn’t follow his rules of concept-building. Though Mannheim discusses the problem of the planning of holistically interpreted societies, he does it only after a long analysis, which bulks up the central message of his work and sets substantial rationality against the functional. Consequently, all the things he says about social planning after this analysis, could be interpreted exclusively in the context of these two types of modern rationality. Neither these two rationalities or their opposition, nor the concept of rationality itself are mentioned in course of Popper’s measures for concept-building, which course of measures seems to be monomaniac. By the same logic, Mannheim could have got to the holisticism of social planning even from the interpretation of the 9^th Symphony to get the criticism on which basis he could be considered a communist[18].

The symmetrical relation between the concept-building strategies of neoliberalism and that of postmodernism represents a significant contrast: neopositivism established and expected a reduced, physicalist concept-building, while postmodernism created and expected an extended one on the basis of a sociology of knowledge (Wissenssoziologie).

This great symmetry had many negative consequences for the philosophy of the past decades. In this situation, a social ontological law is prevailing with a so to say conceptual automatism, namely those effects, which originate in the two opposing, great complexes, and which – through the way they are strenghtening each other – have extraordinary strong influence. This also means, all mutual negative effects of postmodernism and neoliberalism-neopositivism proved to be actual forces which influenced history.

But instead of recalling these numerous consequences, we would focus on further basic issues of the great basic symmetry, appearing in symmetry-relations on the field of concept-building/constitution of a subject.

In the view of neoliberalism-neopositivism, everything which does not fit in the process of reductive concept-building, is metaphysics. In the view of postmodernism, every way of thinking up to this time is metaphysics. The symmetry-relation – even if not entirely – exists[19]. The situation is the same concerning the neopositivist-neoliberal selection in the field of philosophical objectiveness (Gegenständlichkeit) (and concerning selection among the rest), as well as concerning the postmodernist elimination of the material sphere. A symmetrical element is propagating the end of philosophy on both sides (this issue has already been dealt with on the course of this study), which practically means in both respects, that the two complexes define themselves as the last valid philosophy[20]. Similar symmetry can be pointed out in the question of “the end of history” as well as in the field of the related problem of utopistic potential, and in respect of the emerging problem of nihilism.

The relation is also symmetrical in respect to its fundamental orientation, namely that the improper philosophical disposition leads to the right political group-identificational attitude, but on the contrary, the proper choice of a group and the proper articulation of group-loyalty – which articulation is regarded as political – opens the way to occupy the proper philosophical starting positions. This relationship is by all means ideological, however, both great complexes deny the existence of it. The problem of ideologies has however direct presentations as well. The anti-communism of Popper or Hayek was not an unknown phenomenon, and neither was Derrida’s book on Marx. Both great complexes show up new forms of ideology. The complex of neoliberalism-neopositivism seems to be practically the reverse of vulgar Marxism. While vulgar Marxism declared one concrete form of ideological science, neoliberalism-neopositivism declared (implicitly) one concrete form of science prevailing ideology. The ideological content of postmodernism is also completely original. We can join in postmodernist thinking with success only if we previously effectively acquainted the attitudes which are only suggested, and not expounded explicitly. This is a preliminary fellowship as well, although it’s obvious that it would be difficult to define this form of ideology extemporaneously, and at the same time, with an accuracy of the sociology of knowledge (Wissenssoziologie). (It’s another problem that the acceptance of deconstruction could mean an ideological joint even directly, as this can be proved by hundreds of the representatives of the director’s theatre; of course, the preliminary measure of missioning can’t be missing here either). At the same time (and typically), these two new ideologies can hardly be analyzed conceptually, moreover, these ideologies are veiled as well. The mask for neoliberalism-neopositivism is “strong science”; the mask of the postmodern complex is that constant, avantgardist enthusiasm, which is deeply embedded in European mentality[21].

Common metaphor for the complexes of postmodernism and neoliberalism-neopositivism might be the metaphor for the police identity check. Neopositivism-neoliberalism is striving for obtaining the position of checking identities, and it lets one get into the paradise of “Philosophy 2000” only if he meets its reductionist requirements. It forgoes all other criteria of legitimation. Postmodernist Schengen eliminates the identity check, so it forgoes the verification itself.

We refuse this alternative, not merely because it’s not consistent with our own concept. We regard it as a bitter problem, that the narrowing of the rules of philosophical verification as well as the elimination of this verification are basically not achieved through intersubjective discourses, but through interpersonal power, and what is more, in the most sinister period of this power, before appointing philosophical methods[22]. Analyzing the micro and macro relations of this power is essential for the progress of philosophy, or maybe for its mere survival. That is to say, philosophy cannot live under conditions which are most likely to be called “Kafkaesk”, under which everything is allowed, but it is impossible to justify anything or anyone.

This is the philosophical environment, which can start a dialogue with Nietzsche’s philosophy. This is also the philosophical environment, which makes Nietzsche’s philosophy a supreme alternative for the present as well. All in all, we can see the positive meta-philosophical evolving of today’s philosophy in Nietzsche.

The postmodern carried the possibility of two great philosophical trends at its beginning. One of them was creative and productive philosophical synthesis, interdiscoursivity or productive eclecticism. Although this trend appeared clearly, prominent personalities joined it, and important works were dedicated to it, the leading stratum of intelligentsia raised the other trend, difference-logic and difference-thinking into a hegemonous position. In the above mentioned comparison of postmodern and neoliberalism, postmodern was practically represented by its hegemonous difference-logical version already. We would like to present the trend of difference-logic only insofar as it’s needed for grounding its inevitable comparison with Nietzsche. The basic component of difference-logic is an ontologization of the most important formal or summing terms of epistemology, for which Hegel’s philosophy is a classical example. All kinds of modern philosophy moved on towards differentiation, towards the differentiating relativization of absolutely or relatively absolute measures. All kinds of modern philosophy (thus Nietzsche as well, and Hegel, who pronounced the final identity of identical and non-identical) announces the increase of differentiation, as well as the increase in the force of its mediation, so it can make the non-identities outspoken explicitly in differentiation recognizable, possible to communicate, and possible to refer to one another[23].

And finally, difference-logic doesn’t fight for the mediation of increasing difference, and thus it occupies a totally new philosophical position compared to epistemology in general. Even neoliberalism-neopositivism can be apprehended as a new variant of difference-thinking, even if not right by the systematical and structural characteristics of postmodern philosophy. Not in a sense that it would interpret the ontologization of concepts in a way that it would declare the epistemological process impossible, by making mediations – which build a bridge above difference – impossible. But it can be in a sense that even the interpretation of epistemology alone is so exclusive that it could be labelled as difference, not mentioning the interpretation of fields outside direct empirical epistemology as “metaphysics”.

The first component of a possible contemporary constructive meta-philosophy might be obvious now. We can be so critical and relativistic that we elaborate huge amounts of differences, but despite all of our scepticism and criticism, we still don’t need to take the basis of difference-logic. The second component of this possibility is the fact that we aren’t forced to declare ourselves “the end of philosophy”, the representatives of the last legitimate way of thinking, as there’s nothing that would objectively justify this thought. The third component of a constructive meta-philosophy is that we don’t need to ordain any right philosophical system of categories. We might apprehend philosophical, or even esthetical or political “oeuvres” into the greatest depths, still we can acknowledge the chance of methodological freedom to everyone, even if it exceeds the boundaries of anarchy. It could be the fourth component of the new variant that we don’t need to instrumentalize the suspicion of metaphysics for anyone. For the metaphysics-concept appearing in the spirit of “another world”, defines philosophies itself, even without any suspicion, so there’s no need to maintain a systematical position for instrumentalized and exclusive suspicions in philosophy. As the fifth component of the development, we suggest that we should find our position in each intellectual and social group according to a chosen philosophical point of view. Choosing the opposite way, i.e. the “right” choice of the group to identify with, leads to the right philosophical point of view, and thus to the right consciousness – well, this approach is still totally unacceptable for us. The sixth component of the new meta-philosophy may be the rejection of the possibility that our philosophy would become an institution and build out imperially. The belief that such an institution could only be an obstacle to finding the truth, and the other belief that any form of power is sure to set back the search for truth, both provide us a weighty reason to do so.

Furthermore, the act of filling the philosophical vacuum by means of meta-philosophy, coincided with other significant new needs of orientation from the aspect of time, as well as of socially relevant thinking processes. Most of all, with the perception of the end of the historical era which had begun in 1945, and with a need inevitably raising in such cases, to create the conceptual bases of the new era, which would grow beyond the closing era. This need was the reason of the birth of many “post” –trends (postindustrialism, post-structuralism, postmaterial values, etc.), among which the postmodern era, which acquired hegemony later on, was still just one of the many aspirations. The philosophically-historically singular measure in this connection is the fact that a philosophical vacuum, which could only be filled with a meta-philosophy (or at least it came into being after the decline of the two great trends), coincided with decisive general and non-theoretical needs of orientation, i.e. a process which can be characterized by the most subtle philosophical motions, coincided with a theoretical orientation which can be considered “normal” in a concrete respect of the sociology of knowledge.

As we saw the present’s positive meta-philosophical development in Nietzsche[24], we must not forget about the fact that the present has a chance for a negative meta-philosophy as well.

Postmodernism and neoliberalism-neopositivism (although in different ways, but in a deeply symmetrical relation) overwrites mediation- and identity-logic – which were taken almost to perfection in the 19^th century – in a critical manner. This double criticism frees the way ahead of the triumph of difference-logic all at once. From an indirect, “sociological” aspect, bourgeoisie, as well as proletariat are diminished. From the aspect of cultural criticism, the whole modern bourgeois culture becomes history. Therefore, the ascendance of difference-logic is also a cultural revolution. And last, but not least, the foundation of generic and civilizational values and achievments might disappear, which had indirectly stood behind the logic of mediation. The way opens ahead of a history, society, and “reality”, which couldn’t have been reconstructed by difference-logic, but which could have been made accepted as the reality of “difference-logic”. For us, this is the case of the hegemony of difference-logic as a possible negative meta-philosophy.

The shift from the logic of identity/mediation to the logic of difference gains its explanation in the shift of background dymensions. The fact that the logic of mediation and identity is not an arbitrary and contingent formation, but the result of a huge civilizational process, might totally disappear from the consciousness of historical actors. Mediation and identity relies on the generality of civilizational development, which doesn’t exhaust or dissolve in anyone’s (any particular actor’s) particularity. The legitimacy of difference-logic for itself is given by the appearance that identity and mediation are just as one-dymensional, arbitrary, and particular, as difference-logic. Of course, civilizational development is a complex essence of cultural contents, yet it is by no means a blurry or speculative product. The fact that we can see ourselves in someone else, see identity in difference, was not only a result of purely civilizational or emancipatoric achievments, but also of a row of researches, discoveries, scientific inquiries and scientific theories. Difference-logic doesn’t recognize all this, because it is insensitive for science, in general, for philosophical semantics supported by certain criteria. But difference-logic is not only insensitive for semantics with criteria (what it couldn’t even create by its own methods), but also for generic and civilizational values. Thus the above mentioned shift took place from a logic of identity/mediation built upon generic and civilizational values, towards a difference-logic not built upon generic and civilizational values any more.

All this also means, there are basic differences between these two kinds of logic both in respect of the semantics that can be built out according to their rules, and in the generic and civilizational values they represent.  This is equivalent to the difference between a possible positive and a possible negative version of meta-philosophy.

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